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ABSTRACT
The rst chapter analyzes the impact of gender quota regulation on women’s partici-
pation in politics. Gender quotas are the main policy tools used to encourage participation
in politics. A natural experiment in Spanish municipal elections is exploited to study the
success of such reforms. Gender quotas are found to improve the number of women can-
didates, but due to strategic reaction from political parties, much fewer women are being
elected. Political parties disproportionately allocate women to the lowest possible position
while still complying with the law. Parties have a propensity to assign women candidates
to positions where they have relatively low chance of being elected. There is also no shift
in public policy toward spending preferred by women.
The second chapter presents empirical evidence in support of the Leviathan model of
government. In Spain, the number of politicians chosen in local elections depends on the
population of the municipality. Using a data set that covers over two decades of municipal
elections, I present two main results. First, there is an unusual concentration of munici-
palities (bunching) with reported populations just above the threshold that increases the
number of local representatives. I present compelling evidence that elected ocials ma-
nipulate population gures in advance of upcoming elections in order to maximize the
size of the council. Second, I use machine learning techniques to construct an unbiased
vi
measure of population based on luminosity data and census population gures, and study
which municipalities are more likely to misreport based on the quality of the democratic
institutions. Based on those measures, I conclude that misreporting is more likely to hap-
pen in municipalities with higher turnout and less parties in their council.
The nal chapter studies the impact that World War II fatalities had on political pref-
erences during the twentieth century in the United States. We document enlistment and
fatalities at the county level and use this variation to study the hypothesis that fatalities
permanently shifted U.S. political preferences. In particular, we test whether the proxi-
mate casualties theory, which states that voters punish incumbents in the short run after
a war, aected United States counties after World War II. We conclude that there is not
enough evidence in our analysis to determine that fatalities during World War II signi-
cantly impacted long term political preferences.
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Chapter 1
Gender Quotas and Women’s Political
Empowerment. Evidence from Spain
1.1 Introduction
Gender quota legislation has been the most common policy tool used to increase women’s
participation in political activities. The 2014 Atlas of Gender Quotas states that 118 coun-
tries (about 60%) in the world imposed some sort of gender quota system in their elections
(Dahlerup, Hilal, Kalandadze, and Kandawasvika-Nhundu (2013)). From an economic and
policy perspective, it is important to understand the impact of such widespread reforms,
in terms of whether they help correct gender imbalances, the extent of their eectiveness
and what makes them successful.
The present study considers one particular country where gender quota legislation
was introduced as part of a larger eort by the government to establish equality between
women and men in many aspects of society, Spain. On March 22nd, 2007, a new law was
introduced to help correct gender imbalances in the Spanish economy and government.
Article 44 of this law states that all lists of candidates presented to municipal elections
must have a balanced gender representation, such that either of the genders must compose
at least 40% of the list. Studying the consequences of this reform is relevant for several
1
reasons.
First, extensive literature has been remarkably insightful in studying the role of women
in government in developing countries (Duo (2012)) but work on the impact of gender
quotas in developed economies is more scarce. Several studies have focused on a natural
experiment in India, where the head position in a few randomly selected villages was re-
served for women. This was a perfect scenario for studying the impact of having a female
politician heading the the government. Chattopadhyay and Duo (2004) conclude that
policy was enacted to better reect women’s desire in those villages with a female head
of council.
A few studies focused on developed countries and investigated a short lived gender
reform quota in Italy: De Paola, Scoppa, and Lombardo (2010) nd that gender quotas
improve female politician’s election probabilities, and Weeks and Baldez (2015) and Bal-
trunaite, Bello, Casarico, and Profeta (2014) exploit identical natural experiment to argue
that the quality of politicians remained unchanged after the reform. In the same Italian
context, Gagliarducci and Paserman (2011) argue that networks in the political arena, pre-
dominantly male dominated, impair women’s odds of success, measured in probabilities of
reelection. In Sweden, a fre researchers studied gender quotas at the party level, and they
found evidence that gender quotas may improve eciency not just through policy. Besley,
Folke, Persson, and Rickne (2017) show that a gender quota reform in fact improved the
quality of politicians, by driving low-quality male politicians out of the electoral process.
Second, in this particular application, the policy mandated that parties present a min-
imum number of women as candidates in their lists, rather than having council seats
reserved for women. This type of gender quota legislation the most common one. As of
2014, 60 countries had implemented candidate quotas, whereas 36 had enforced “reserved
seats" legislation (Dahlerup et al. (2013)). A third type of common gender quota legislation
is voluntary party quotas, where own parties enforce the policy of a minimum number
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of women in their lists. O’Brien and Rickne (2016) presented a recent study where they
analyzed a gender quota reform imposed within the Swedish Social Democratic Party, and
found that gender quotas can increase women’s political representation.
Third, the Spanish reform lasted longer than other natural experiements, which al-
lowed me to study the treatment eect over time. Morevoer, in some cases, how long the
reform has been in place has been shown to be very relevant. Beaman, Chattopadhyay,
Duo, Pande, and Topalova (2009) and Beaman, Duo, Pande, and Topalova (2012) show
that girls’ inspirations after gender reform legislation change only after the gender re-
form has been in eect for two terms, not just one. This means that the short term impact
of gender quotas may be dierent than the long term eect, and this particular natural
experiment allows me to distinguish between the two.
This policy reform helps to cleanly identify treatment eects. According to the law,
not all public elections are subject to the reform, and there is variation in the timing of im-
plementation. In 2007, when the reform rst passed, only municipalities with more than
5,000 people were aected by the law. In 2011, this threshold was reduced to 3,000, except
for those municipalities in islands where 5,000 was retained. This legal design provides a
perfect natural experiment where the causal eect of the reform can be estimated using
a regression discontinuity design. I observe candidates in three types of municipalities:
those aected by the reform since 2007, those when the reform was enacted in 2011, and
those where the gender quotas have never been in eect. I use this variation to understand
how the reform aected women’s political representation, how parties reacted strategi-
cally to this reform, and whether the reform had an eect on policy choices in terms of
public spending.
The results of my analysis show that this reform helped improve women’s political
representation but it failed to fully empower them. It increased the share of female can-
didates, both at the 5,000 and 3,000 thresholds by around 7-8% when the reform was rst
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introduced. However, these gains translated in smaller increases in the proportion of
women elected, due to two reasons. First, parties reacted by assigning women to the low-
est possible position while still in compliance with the gender quotas. Seconds, parties
allocate women to positions where they had fewer chances of being elected. Therefore,
the strategic behavior of political parties prevents the reform from empowering women. I
also investigate whether the reform impacted public spending toward areas preferred by
women. I nd no evidence that this is the case. Generally, the reform was unsuccessful
in creating a permanent impact that increased women’s political power. On the contrary,
the dynamic eects of the reform are decreasing over time: even when gender quotas
had a positive impact, the magnitude of the impact decreased over time, and was mostly
negligible by 2015. For instance, the proportion of women elected increases by 5% when
the reform is rst introduced, but it falls to 2% by 2015.
This paper builds upon the results from (Bagues and Campa, 2017), who studied this
same reform and its ability to empower women. The present study however is able to de-
termine why gender quota legislation is not as successful as it is expected. Public percep-
tion or voter behavior does not hold women back, but the strategic behavior by political
institutions that does not allow women to achieve positions of power. Other papers study
political gender dynamics in Spain. Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015) used the same reform to
test whether gender quotas negatively aected parties that were most aected by them.
The ndings suggest that they in fact helped those in the elections. This is particularly
relevant to the present study results, because my results indicate that political parties are
obstructing women. The study results show that this behavior is inecient if political par-
ties main goal is to win elections. Campa (2011) uses this reform to conclude that there is
no change in public spending. Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012) focus on Senate elections
and show that party dynamics play a big role in women’s lack of political power: even
when they make the ballot, parties tend to nominate women to lower positions. Besides
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the political arena, Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) study gender discrimination in the
selection of judges.
Throughout the sample period, the political position of women in untreated (smaller)
municipalities is improving over time. This motivates me to test the hypothesis that the
convergence pattern between treated and untreated municipalities could be because of
the reform itself. I explore whether geographical spillovers could have caused part of
the growth in the untreated municipalities. However, the results suggest the contrary:
in 2007, when parties had little time to react to the reform, municipalities that are not
aected by the law put less women on their lists if they are surrounded by more “treated"
neighboring municipalities (municipalities where the gender quotas were in eect). This is
some compelling evidence that, in 2007, political parties may have “poached” some female
candidates from nearby municipalities when they experience a shortage in the supply of
candidates.
Finally, the study analyzes whether the reform shifts public spending to issues pre-
ferred by women. It is important to note that, according to the median voter or the Coasian
model, the personal views (or gender) of the politician do not aect equilibrium policy.
However, if elected public ocials do not perfectly represent the preferences of their con-
stituency, but at least partially their own, and women’s preferences dier from those of
men, then an imbalance in gender representation will also result in inecient policies.
The literature shows support for both parts of this theory. First, several studies conrm
that both personal preferences matter, and that women’s preferences dier: Levitt (1996)
shows that US senators’ personal ideology accounts for half of the weight in their deci-
sions. Lott and Kenny (1999), Miller (2008) and Edlund and Pande (2002) are good exam-
ples of the evidence in favor of women having diverse political preferences. The rst two
show that surage coincided with both an increase in state government expenditures and
a decrease in infant mortality rate, better representing women’s policy preferences. The
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last investigates how these dierent preferences are related to the decrease in marriage
rates in the United States. Second, Svaleryd (2009) shows that gender quotas in Sweden
resulted in a shift in public policy, showing increased spending in childcare and education.
However, in the United States Ferreira and Gyourko (2014) nd that having a woman as
mayor has no impact on policy outcomes, although the authors do nd women to perform
better as politicians, which is measured by a higher incumbency rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 explains the institutional setting
and reform. Section 3 covers the data sources and the empirical strategy, focusing on its
validity. The main study results are presented in section 4. A couple of extensions are
presented in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Setting
Spain has been a democratic country since 1975. It is a highly decentralized country,
governed through a parliamentary monarchy system. It has three main levels of govern-
ment: the central government, which would be the equivalent of the United States federal
government, the autonomous communities, which control areas of government such as
education or health provision, and the local municipalities. There are 16 autonomous
communities and about 8,100 municipalities.
Municipal elections are held every four years. All the elections are conducted simul-
taneously, usually in late April or early May. It is a multiparty system: any political party
can submit a list of candidates. The list must be numbered and the number of candidates
must be equal to the size of the political council. Council size is an odd number, which
is determined solely by the population of the municipality. Figure 2·1 shows this rela-
tionship in detail. The rst person in each list is the candidate for mayor post for that
particular political party. Votes are cast to a political party and not particular candidates,
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and seats are assigned by the Jeerson method (also known as the D’Hondt method), an
approximately proportional mechanism1. Consequently, positioning in the list is very im-
portant: candidates near the top of the list have a much higher likelihood of being elected
than their counterparts farther down the list. Because many parties present candidates
lists, it is often the case that one party does not reach at least half plus one of the council
size seats, which would grant this party majority, and its rst candidate the position of
mayor. In such occasions, the choice of mayor is through negotiations between the dif-
ferent parties are represented. In the majority of cases, the rst candidate in the strongest
member of the coalition will be chosen as the mayor.
The present study analyzes the impact of candidate gender quotas in municipal elec-
tions introduced by Law 3/2007 “Ley de Igualdad”. Article 44 of the law states that all
lists presented for any election must have a balanced gender representation. It denes
“balanced gender representation” as each gender composing at least 40% of the list. Note
that this policy provides both a minimum (40%) and a maximum (60%) number of female
candidates (40%). Importantly, the article does not apply to municipalities with a popu-
lation of less or equal to 5,000 people in 2007. In the subsequent election cycle, in 2011,
the threshold was lowered to include all mainland municipalities with populations greater
than 3,000. Municipalities in the Spanish archipelagos, the Canary and Baleares islands,
were still subject to the threshold established in 2007. This lends itself to a regression dis-
continuity design, where the eect of the reform can be estimated at two dierent points
of the population distribution. The next section, explains the data sources, and tests the
validity of such design. Another important distortion that the law introduces is that the
minimum quota has to be met for each of the ve consecutive positions within the can-
didate list. The study results show that this is relevant and political parties will react
strategically.
1If interested in the properties of this allocation mechanism, check Balinski and Young (1978).
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The law was rst enforced on March 22nd of 2007. This was a month and a half before
the municipal elections of 2007 were conducted. This implies that parties might have
been unable to strategically react to the law when it was rst passed, and it raises the
interesting issue of whether there are dierent responses in 2007 and 2011, when parties
may have had more time to explore new candidates or strategically create their election
lists. The study nds some evidence that this might have been the case.
One of the most attractive features of this reform is that it allows for studying not only
the short term impact in 2007 and 2011, but also the medium term dynamic eects that
gender quotas had in treated municipalities by 2015. The possible impacts of the reform
are graphically shown in Figure 1·1. This graph, which plots time on the horizontal axis
versus a theoretical outcome that would capture the intended gain in women’s position.
The vertical red line represents the time during which the reform takes place. The dashed
line shows the counterfactual evolution of the outcome had the reform not taken place.
Based on this conterfactual, both the short term impact of the law can be calculated (∆Y1),
as well as the long term eect of gender quotas (∆Y2).
In the short term, a gender quota may or may not have an impact. If it does, this
would be depicted as a sudden increase in the outcomes at the time of the reform, rep-
resented by the red vertical line in the diagrams. The present study is in line with the
literature, which nds that gender quotas generally have an impact on women’s candi-
dacy and election rates. However, how things evolve in the medium or long term is less
clear. Even believing that gender quotas have a short term impact, we could later observe
three distinct possibilities, each shown in one the panels of the Figure. First, this change in
gender ratios and women’s political participation is a permanent one: it creates a wedge
between treated and untreated municipalities, and this wedge remains constant over time.
This would be depicted by “One Time Permanent Impact”. If this was the case, the short
term impact of the reform would be the same as the long term impact (∆Y1 = ∆Y2), and
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dynamics would not play a signicant role. Another possibility is that the reform has a
short term impact, but a smaller long term eect (∆Y1 > ∆Y2), as shown by the curve
labeled “Transitory Impact”. This would occur if women’s relative position in the society
is strengthening over time, and the reform decelerates the growth of women’s outcomes
when compared to no reform. In this case, the reform is improving the gender ratios that
would have happened either way a little bit earlier in time.
Finally, the best case scenario for the gender reform is shown by the possibility labeled
“Poverty Trap”, owing to its relationship to the theory widely studied in Development Eco-
nomics. This theory states that certain situations (such as poverty) are a self reinforced.
This could be the case if women had greater presence in the political arena: if there are no
women candidates and the voters believe that women are inferior in skills to their male
counterparts, parties have no incentive to eld female candidates. In that case, voters fail
to learn about the true skill of female politicians and parties are not motivated to change
their behavior. However, as it is the case with poverty trap, such vicious cycle can be
broken with a one-time intervention. If gender quotas add enough women on the lists,
and voters learn about the women’s true skill, then municipalities may be set on a new
equilibrium, in which case, woman’s outcomes improve faster than when the reform did
not take place. This would result in a longer term eect bigger than the short term impact
(∆Y1 < ∆Y2). The next section describes the data collection method, and the strategy to
empirically test these hypothesis.
1.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
Electoral data for each Spanish municipality from 2003 to 2015 were collected. These data
are provided by the Ministerio del Interior. The Ministerio del Interior also provided data
on the names and position of all candidates in each election year. Combining both of
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these data, a data set was created with all candidates, their name, gender, political party,
position on the list and their election to the council. Later, this data set is merged to public
spending data available since 2010. Although data on public spending is available for the
previous years, the level of disaggregation is not relevant to the present analysis.
The study duration provides a panel of about 8,000 municipalities observed at four time
points: 2003, before the reform takes place; 2007, soon after its enactment; and 2011 and
2015. Names and gender of politicians were not collected by the Ministry prior to 2003.
For the purpose of identication, the main feature of this reform is that it does not aect
all municipalities simultaneously. In 2007, only municipalities with population greater
than 5,000 were aected. In 2011, the threshold was lowered in the mainland to 3,000.
This implies that the “treated” municipalities increased in 2011 by all those that reported
populations between 3,000 and 5,000. This also means that there may be dynamic eects
at play. If we assume that municipalities did not change population brackets before the
2015 election, and most of them did not, some municipalities will have been treated twice,
some once, some none at all.
In the four election years of data collected, 77,000 parties presented a list of candidates
for municipal elections. Of these, nearly 25,000 occur in municipalities and years where
gender quotas were in eect (those are considered treated elections or municipalities),
and the rest occur without gender requirements. For the rest of the analysis, the sample is
restricted to municipalities with population between 1,000 and 10,000. Several small mu-
nicipalities have fewer than 1,000 people, but they have been excluded from the analysis
for several reasons: rst, they are distant from any discontinuity, so they do not play a role
in helping to identify the impact of the reform. Therefore, dropping these municipalities
prevents descriptive statistics from overrepresenting small municipalities. Second, some
of these municipalities have a dierent political system, not based on party lists, but in
direct democracy, so they are not comparable with the rest of the study. With regard to
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municipalities with population greater than 10,000, similar reasoning is followed. They
are distant from either threshold, so they do not play a role in identifying the treatment
eect, there are few, and much dierent from the rest of the sample, since they include
the most urban and populated areas of Spain. Therefore, the treatment eect in relatively
small municipalities, where social and gender norms might usually dier from those in
bigger cities. Once those restrictions are applied, a sample of nearly to 800,000 candidates
emerges, with approximately 200,000 candidates per election year. Of those, more than
50,000 are elected every election year.
Table 1.1 provides a summary of descriptive statistics. The table presents the position
and evolution over time of women’s participation in Spanish municipal elections. The
percentage of woman candidates increases from slightly more than 30% in 2003 to 43% in
2015. The percentage of women that are elected follows a similar pattern, raising from 27
to 38%. However the proportion of women who are selected as head of the list remains
surprisingly constant, at 4%. This shows that, in general, women’s relative position in
the political arena is improving over time, even though it does not reach equality. The
percentage of women in top three positions ranges from a quarter in 2003 elections to
36% in 2015.
The average municipality in the sample used in the present analysis has a population
of over 3,700 in 2003 and 4,200 in 2015. The average council size ranges between 9 and 11
seats. Finally, that turnout is quite high in municipal elections but is decreasing over time.
Due to data availability, turnout is dened as total number of cast votes divided by the
total population in the municipality. A more accurate denition would use the number
of eligible voters as the denominator, but that information is unavailable. Therefore, this
measure of turnout can be considered as a lower-bound proxy for actual voter turnout.
Descriptive statistics on the overall average yearly spending in three particular categories
have been found in the literature to be preferred by women in Spain: pensions, health and
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unemployment insurance. Owing to the economic and nancial crisis in Spain from 2008
to 2014, it is not surprising that public spending trends downwards in the data.
Finally, two variables of interest considered in the present study are whether women
are put in “realistic positions" or whether they are “irrelevant candidates". These two
variables play a key role in the results. The rationale behind these variables is that parties
have a good estimate prior to elections on how many votes, and therefore seats, they will
obtain. Therefore, in response to the reform, parties might position women in situations
where they are on the list, but have no chance of winning. These variables try to capture
the following accurately: do parties react to the reform by allocating women to positions
in which they think they will not win? Or do they put them in positions where they have
a fair chance of being elected?
To construct these variable, the study focuses on the subsample of observations for
which party membership can be linked over time (around 70% of all my data). For that
subsample, a candidate is dened to to be in a “realistic position" if their position for the
upcoming election is one that was elected previously. Therefore, the number of seats won
in the previous election is taken as a proxy for parties’ expectation of the number of seats
they think they will win. This is a simple and straightforward estimation of the prior. A
more convoluted expectation function could be created, but this one is tractable, and it
has good predicting power (65% R2).
E(Winner)ijpt = 1
{
Positionijpt ≤ E(Seats)jpt
}
Those who are not put in “realistic positions" are termed as “irrelevant candidates" in
this study. This variable is dened for candidate i , in municipality j, from political party p
in election year t . The percentage of women is higher among irrelevant candidates than
realistic positions, but it seems the gap is smaller in 2015 than it was in 2007.
12
Given the full names and party associations of candidates, they can be linked over time.
Based on those links, the proportion of women who are “returning candidates" are listed,
dened as having appeared as a candidate in any previous election, and “new candidates"
as women who are new to the pool of candidates. Since the study starting year is 2003,
this variable considers all candidates as new in that year. For subsequent elections, around
four fths of all women are new candidates, and one fth has ran for oce before.
The present study uses a regression discontinuity design as its identication strategy,
based on the two population thresholds that determine whether the gender quotas are
binding in 2007 and 2011, for 5,000 and 3,0000 people respectively. The main identifying
assumption of this empirical method is that whether a municipality is found at the just at
the right or left of the cuto is unrelated to the treatment and outcomes. If the population
is randomly assigned, then this assumption is true. This assumption can be visually tested
by showing a density plot of the assignment variable (population). The McCrary test is a
more rigorous statistical test that checks for smooth density at the cuto. The p-values
for this test are 0.012 for the 5,000 threshold and 0.303 for the 3,000 threshold. This implies
that this test rejects the null of smooth density only for the 5,000 threshold, and not for
the 3,000 one. These results are visually conrmed in Figure 1·3a and 1·3b. In Figure 1·3a,
some bunching can be observed right after the threshold, which disappears in the 1·3b.
This is slightly concerning, but in a previous study Carvajal (2017) explores this behavior
and concludes that the bunching is due to the desire of these municipalities for a bigger
council size. Recall that council size varies at the 5,000 threshold but not at the 3,000. See
Carvajal (2017) for more details.
Bunching would invalidate the regression discontinuity design if municipalities were
choosing their population level in a way that was correlated to their gender dynamics.
This can be at least partially tested. If municipalities are bunching, and this relates to
gender politics, we should observe dierences before the reform takes place between mu-
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nicipalities that bunch and those that do not. There always is a possibility of selection in
unobservable characteristics, however, no dierences in observable variables will allevi-
ate the concerns. The test results are shown in the appendix, in the last four columns of
Table ??. These results focus on a subsample around the discontinuities (between 2,800
and 3,200 for the 3,000 threshold, and 4,600 and 5,400 for the 5,000 one) before the quotas
were introduced. A large bandwidth for the 5,000 cuto is needed to include more munic-
ipalities. The test explores whether there are signicant dierences in several variables
in the municipalities above and below the threshold in 2003. If there were, this implies
that municipalities are not randomly assigned around the threshold and the non-random
assignment is related to the gender ratios in these municipalities. The averages below
and above the cuto are similar for all nonmechanical variables at both the thresholds
(obviously population and total number of votes are higher above the threshold). In par-
ticular, the turnout, percentage of female candidates, proportion of lists over quota and
the number of women in top three positions are almost identical at the 5,000 threshold,
where there is bunching. More female politicians are elected above that threshold. The
Results section will show the regression discontinuity estimates for the year 2003 as well.
These estimates will work as Placebo tests: directly testing for smoothness of the out-
come variables around the cuto pre-reform. The results are encouraging in support of
the identication strategy adopted in the study.
A subsequent section of the paper explores the idea that the reform aected untreated
municipalities. If gender norms are changing in municipalities subject to the reform, it
could be the case that neighboring municipalities are mirroring this change. To test this
hypothesis, the data set is geographically located using an algorithm that searches the
name of the municipality on Google Maps and retrieves its coordinates. With these coor-
dinates, the data are merged to a shape-le that contains the geographical information of
all municipalities in Spain. This procedure provides information about which municipal-
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ities share a geographical border with each other, and this information is used to test for
the presence of spillovers.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Candidacy Rates
This section presents the main study results. The estimation strategy follows a sharp
regression discontinuity, where the bandwidth and robust standard errors are calculated
according to the procedure outlined by (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik, 2014). In this
particular application, there are two cutos, and four election years. In 2003, the cutos
did not imply a change in treatment status. In other words, there are two Placebo tests in
this year. The tables report the Placebo test at the 5,000 threshold for 2003, because this is
the rst cuto to be aected by the reform. No statistically signicant eect is found on
any outcome at the 3,000 threshold in 2003. Another natural Placebo test reported in the
tables is the coecient at the 3,000 threshold in 2007, because these municipalities were
not aected by the reform until 2011.
The RD estimates at the 5,000 threshold in 2007 and at the 3,000 threshold on 2011 and
2015 showcase the main eects of the reform. In these cases, political parties in munici-
palities to the right of the threshold are aected by the reform, and those to the left are
not. The evolution of these estimates over time is relevant, since it reveals the dynamic
impact of the reform.
Finally, the estimates at the 5,000 cuto in 2011 and 2015 are of interest. In these
two cases, both municipalities to the right and to the left of the threshold are subject to
gender quotas. However, municipalities to the right have been subject to gender quotas for
a longer duration: in 2007, larger municipalities had already been exposed to the reform,
whereas those with population lower than 5,000 experienced this reform for the rst time.
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In 2011, larger municipalities have been exposed twice, and smaller ones only once. If
these estimates were signicant, that would support the hypothesis that the number of
times a municipality is treated has a signicant impact on gender outcomes.
The rst stage impact of the reform is shown in Figure 1·5, and in Table 1.2. Figure 1·5
is a scatter plot of the dependent variable in bins of the forcing variable, population. This
means the dependent variable is averaged for each bin or bracket of population. The size
of the bin is set to 100. Each column in Table 1.2 corresponds to a dierent election year.
The expected percentage of women candidates at the 3,000 population threshold for each
election year is reported. Even untreated municipalities showed an increasing trend in the
number of women candidates: in 2003 only 31% of all candidates were women, whereas
by 2015, the number rose to 41%. The Placebo tests are reassuring. Small and statistically
insignicant coecients for both reported Placebos: the 2003 estimate at the 5,000 cuto
and the 2007 estimate at the 3,000 cutof. In 2007, there was a signicant increase at the
5,000 threshold, where the proportion of women candidates increased by 8%. This was
the direct impact of the reform in 2007. These coecients conrm the results depicted in
the rst two panels of Figure 1·5.
In 2011, when the municipalities above 3,000 were rst subject to the reform, there
was an increase in the proportion of women of 7.8%, which is similar to that observed
four years earlier at the 5,000 cuto. The coecient for the 5,000 threshold in 2011 is
zero. This implies that after being treated in 2007, the municipalities above 5,000 did not
further increased their share of female candidates. In fact, the smaller treated municipal-
ities catch up to them by 2011. Finally, column four reports the 2015 coecients. First,
there is no dierence between municipalities above and below the 5,000 threshold. This
fact, combined with the near zero eect for the same coecient in 2011, reinforces the
theory that the length of treatment had no impact on the proportion of female candidates.
Second, the coecient for the 3,000 threshold is still highly signicant. Nevertheless, it is
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smaller than its 2011 counterpart: the eect has decreased from 7.8% to 6%. There appears
to be some convergence from control municipalities, those with population below 3,000.
These insights can be visually conrmed in the last two panels of Figure 1·5.
In general, it seems that the reform fairly successful in the short run: it increased the
share of female candidates by 7-8 percentage points right after being introduced, but that
eect diminishes four years after the reform. In addition, no systematic dierences appear
between those being treated once or twice.
However, this overall increase in candidacy rates hides heterogeneity across positions:
the increase in the proportion of women candidates is not constant across all positions
in the list. Figure 1·6 shows the proportion of woman by position in each year and pop-
ulation bracket. In 2003, there is a smooth distribution among positions for all types of
municipalities, although women are relatively unlikely to be in one of the top two posi-
tions. In 2007, this was still true for municipalities that were not subject to gender quotas.
However, a clear pattern is observed for the proportion of woman candidates in munici-
palities with population higher than 5,000, where gender quotas are introduced: there is
signicant increase in the proportion of women candidates in positions 4 and 5 relative
to 6 and 7. The explanation to this pattern is obvious: since the reform forces parties to
have 40% of women for each ve positions, parties disproportionately place women in the
lowest position while still complying with the law. This pattern can be observed again
with the newly treated municipalities in 2011. However, by 2015, at least for municipali-
ties with population above 5000 (those that have been treated twice already), this pattern
is less clear. This could be due to women moving up the list as parties learn about their
true ability.
It is evident parties are reacting strategically to the reform. Therefore, it is possible
that parties disproportionately allocating female candidates to positions where they have
no realistic shot of winning. To test this hypothesis, candidates are categorized into “re-
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alistic positions" and “irrelevant candidates". The impact that the reform these two types
of candidates is very dierent. Table 1.3, and Figures 1·9 and 1·10 show the results.
Once again, the RD estimates are signicant in 2007 at the 5,000 threshold and in 2011
at the 3,000 threshold. However, the table shows that the estimate for the increase in the
proportion of women candidates is twice as big for women in irrelevant positions. This
implies that parties are strategically allocating women disproportionately more to posi-
tions where the possibility of being elected is remote. This disparity in the size of the
eect was still present in 2015, so it did not seem to dissipate over time.
Finally, how the probability that a woman heads the list changes after the reform is
implemented is explored. This is particularly relevant position, since being rst on the list
that the individual is the mayoral candidate for that particular political party. Therefore,
if the explicit goal of the reform was to empower women, this is one dimension where
policy makers would like to see an eect. The results are shown in Table 1.4. While the
reform did have a small impact in 2007 (a 4% increase), the eect decreased by half in 2011
(2%) and it was completely insignicant by 2015.
In conclusion, while this reform helped increase women’s candidacy rates, parties
reacted strategically by placing them both in the lower position possible such that they
would still comply with the law, and in positions where they were not expected to win.
In addition, the reform failed in increasing the number of female mayoral candidates in
the medium run.
1.4.2 Election Rates
This section attempts to understand whether this reform is successful in placing women
in oce, not only on the ballot. Table 1.4 shows the regression results for the percentage
of the elected women candidates. These results are shown in Figure 1·8.
The main inferences are as follows: rst, the percentage of women in oce is increas-
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ing over time. From 28% in 2003 to 40% by 2015. The reform was successful in the short
run in increasing the number of female candidates and placing some them in council. The
percentage of women elected increased by 5.6% in 2007 at the 5,000 cuto and by 4.2%
in 2011. The coecient for the 5,000 cuto is not statistically signicant in 2011. which
implies that the newly treated municipalities between 3,000 and 5,000 completely catch
up to those above 5000. This is evidence against the reform placing municipalities in a
higher growth pattern. Finally, the coecient for the 3,000 threshold in 2015 is insignif-
icant. This supports the hypothesis of convergence of smaller municipalities over time,
and a small impact of the reform 8 years after its introduction.
It is not surprising, giving the ndings in the previous section, that the overall size of
the eect is lower in election than candidacy rates: if women are not placed in positions
where they are expected to win, they are being elected less often. Figure 1·7 displays
the election rates for women for each position. As expected, the same pattern is observed
as in the candidacy rates: the proportion of elected women is higher at positions 4 and
5 with respect to positions 5 and 6. The results are quite noisy at very low positions in
the list, since the number of observations of elected candidates whose position was lower
than 6 or 7 is very small, due to low probability of being elected.
Therefore, the reform fails to signicantly increase the number of women in positions
of power: the increase in probability of election is quite small and decreasing over time,
and even when more women are being elected, they are doing so in the fourth or fth
position of the ballot. Party’s strategic behavior holds women back. Convergence patterns
shown by smaller municipalities also seem to reduce the short term eects of the gender
quotas. A later subsection I explore hypothesis by which the reform itself may have been
the cause of the growth in the untreated municipalities.
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1.4.3 Impact on Spending
This section of the paper discusses whether this reform shifted public spending toward
areas preferred by women. Even if the reform had a small eect on election rates of
women, it does not preclude a shift in policy. Women’s bargaining power within the
party may have increased, leading to a shift in public spending, even if the representative
in power is a man.
The sudy by (Carrillo Barroso and Tamayo Sáez, 2011) provides relevant information
to test this hypothesis. These authors use data from the Role of Government survey,
by International Social Survey Programme to study what shapes preferences for public
spending. In this survey, the subjects are asked, for dierent categories of government
spending, whether they would like to see more or less government spending. In particu-
lar, they study whether women have dierent public spending preferences.During 1985-
2009, women in Spain had consistently higher preferences for spending in three areas:
unemployment insurance, pensions and health.
Starting in 2006, public spending by local municipalities was published based on its
function, including the three aforementioned areas. This aids in testing whether, once the
reform was introduced, public spending on unemployment insurance, pensions or health
increased. Not all municipalities report all types of spending through all years. Therefore,
the subsample is an unbalanced panel of candidates in these municipalities. In order to
retain as much statistical power as possible, spending is calculated as the average yearly
spending during the legislature following the municipal election (in logs). If the reform
had an impact on public spending in these areas, we would expect to see positive eects
on the coecients of candidates in municipalities where gender quotas were in eect.
The results are shown in Table 1.5. No statistically signicant eect of the reform on
the type of government spending is observed in any component of public spending. This
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is consistent with the interpretation that the reform was successful exclusively on putting
women in the ballot, but not placing them in inuential positions. It does not support the
theory that women’s bargaining power increased due to the reform.
1.5 Extensions
1.5.1 Spillovers
So far, it appears this policy was only successful in the short run and women’s empow-
erment was hindered by party’s strategic behavior. However, the long term impact of
gender quotas may have been understated if gender quotas also aected parties and can-
didates in municipalities where they were not in eect: it is possible that the imposition
of gender quotas caused a shift in gender norms in untreated municipalities.
If municipalities under the population threshold changed their gender ratios by be-
ing exposed to nearby gender quotas, it would help explain the overall growth path in
women’s outcomes, and imply that the overall improvement was partially due to the new
law. In case of spillovers, political parties introduce more women in their political lists
to mirror nearby municipalities. If that is the case, the regression discontinuity estimates
would understate the impact of the reform, and the conclusion that the reform was not
very successful, or that it did not improve women’s position in the long run would be
wrong. The reform would lead, at least partially, untreated municipalities to catch up to
those aected by gender quotas. This hypothesis is tested next.
Testing for spillovers is not easy, but the strategy followed here sheds some light
on whether the reform aected neighboring municipalities under plausible assumptions.
Through an algorithm and Google Maps coordinates, the data set is matched to its ge-
ographical location, and we are able to determine which municipalities share common
borders. Based on this information, the number of bordering treated municipalities is
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determined for each municipality with population over 250.
Figure 1·4 shows the average number of bordering neighbors that are subject to gender
quotas for each municipality in the sample in 207 and 2011. In 2003 the reform has not yet
taken place. In 2007, the mode is zero, since the reform only aects counties with more
than 5,000 people, and these are uncommon. However, the second most common outcome
is to have one neighboring county that is subject to the reform, and it is almost as common
as having none. In 2011, the distribution of number of treated neighbors shifts to the right,
because the threshold has been decreased to 3,000, and generally more municipalities are
treated. However, it remains true for most counties have none or one neighbor who is
subject to gender quotas.
Based on this, measures are constructed to capture the extent to which the neighboring
municipalities are treated: the proportion of neighboring municipalities subject to gender
quotas. Given the independent variable, the following panel data regression is run:
% Women Candidatesit = β0 + β1t1
{% Treated Neighbors} xYear + β3Popit + δi + γt + εit
The study focuses on the subsample of untreated municipalities, to test whether their
growth is due to their proximity to places where the reform took place. The parameter of
interest is β1t , whether the percentage of women candidates in untreated municipalities
changes dierently when these places are in geographical contact with municipalities
where the gender quotas are in eect for each election year. The dependent variable is
the proportion of female candidates.
We should be concerned with endogeneity in this regression. It could be that geo-
graphical areas where neighbors are treated more often are dierent along some unob-
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served characteristics from those where share of treated neighbors is smaller. One could
imagine that those areas with high share of treated neighbors are on average bigger, more
economically developed and have dierent attitudes towards women. To deal with this
concern: controls directly for population and province xed eects are included. There
are 52 provinces in Spain and this should help control for location specic trends. More-
over, the temporal structure of the data is used, and municipality xed eects are included.
Therefore, identication of β1t comes from municipalities that switch their independent
variable: either they change from having no treated neighbors to some treated neighbors,
or their share of treated neighbors changes over time.
If in either of these regressions β1t > 0, this would be compelling evidence of spillovers:
when a municipality has more neighbors aected by gender quotas, its own gender ratio in
the ballot increases. Note that, however, it would also be plausible to nd that beta1 < 0.
If there is competition for female candidates, and they are a scarce resource, it would
be possible that treated municipalities would “poach” these candidates from untreated
municipalities. These would lead to a decrease in gender ratios in the lists presented in
elections where gender quotas are not binding.
The results from these regressions are shown in Table 1.6. For this table, the percentage
of women candidates or the increase in percentage of female candidates from 2003 to each
election year are regressed on a measure of how often your neighbors are subject to gender
quotas. Columns one and three do not include municipality xed eects, but columns
two and four (the preferred specication) do. In Table 1.6, the independent variable is
the percentage of treated neighbors. Here, there is no positive statistically signicant
impact of having more treated neighbors on the percentage of women candidates a non
treated municipality. However, the coecient in 2007 is signicant but negative. This is
interesting, and it could be explained by the “poaching” theory taking place in 2007 but not
later on, when political parties had more time to react and recruit new female candidates.
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Finally, there is no evidence that the convergence of untreated municipalities was due to
the reform itself. If anything, the reform may have just moved women candidates from
municipalities non subject to gender quotas to those that were.
1.5.2 Eects by 2003 Complier Status
We learn that party behavior is the main driver behind the lack of success of the gender
quota legislation. One fair is whether this eect is homogeneous across all parties, or cer-
tain parties, more “woman friendly" behave dierently. It is dicult to measure “woman
friendliness", particularly when the sample of political parties is so big and heterogeneous:
recall thousands of dierent parties run every four years.
One way to try to answer this is by looking at how parties behaved in the election be-
fore the reform was enacted, in 2003. In particular, we can look at how many women were
allocated as candidates: were these parties already in compliance with the 40% quota? If
they were, we can follow them over time, and see how they react once the reform is en-
acted, and compare their behavior to those parties where the proportion of women was
below the minimum imposed by the law four years later. These are referred as 2003 com-
pliers and 2003 non compliers respectively.
Note, in the process of dividing candidates between compliers and non compliers, the
sample must be restricted to candidates belonging to political parties that can be linked
over time. This reduces the size of the sample, particularly because most of the observa-
tions of candidates from small parties are excluded. Therefore, when analyzing the results
of this exercise, it is necessary to consider that we are looking at a particular subsample
of candidates.
With that caveat in mind, I explore whether there are signicant dierences in how
these two type of parties reacted to the reform. First, Panel A of Table 1.8, shows that
the overall percentage of women candidates increased for both types of parties. This is
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not trivial, since compliers need not have an eect, but they do: in 2007, they increase
the percentage of woman candidates by 3%, and by 5% in 2011, but there is no statistical
impact in 2015. However, as expected, the eect is much larger for non compliers (10% in
2007, 9% in 2011, 8% in 2015). One key dierence here is that the eect is permanent for
non compliers, and temporary for compliers.
Panel B of Table 1.8 shows how this increase in female candidates translates into
elected representatives. However, this panel shows that the despite the fact that women
increased their numbers more in non complier parties, the eect on election rates was, at
least initially, larger for women in complier parties. However, this was only a temporary
increase, and by 2015, there was no longer an impact on election rates in complier parties,
whereas there was a 5% eect on non compliers.
The overall evolution of these two groups can be seen in Figure 1·11 and Figure 1·12.
Both gures arrive at a similar conclusion: the percentage of female candidates, or elected
representatives in municipalities that never had access to the reform displays a gap be-
tween those in complier and non complier parties. We observe almost full instantaneous
convergence in terms of candidacy rates once the reform is introduced: in 2011 for can-
didates in municipalities with population between 3,000 and 5,000, and in 2007 for bigger
municipalities. In terms of election rates though, while there is a pattern of convergence,
there is still a gap between compliers and non compliers non compliers. The gap is smaller
for municipalities subject to the reform.
Panels C and D of Table 1.8 consider the type of positions women were put in: positions
where they were expected to win or not. For 2003 compliers, the reform did not have any
impact on putting women into realistic positions, it had a momentary eect of allocating
them into irrelevant positions. For non compliers, the same pattern is observed as for the
overall population: an increase in both types of positions, but a disproportionate increase
in the proportion of women put into irrelevant positions, as opposed to positions where
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the party expected to the candidate to be elected.
1.6 Conclusion
The present study explores a reform in which a gender oor was introduced in Spanish
municipal elections. This reform states that every list presented to municipal elections
starting in 2007 must have a balanced gender representation. It denes a balanced gen-
der representation as each gender composing at least 40% of the list. However, not all
municipalities are subject to these changes: in 2007 the gender quotas are only imposed
in municipalities with population greater than 5,000. In 2011, the threshold was lowered
to 3,000 for all mainland municipalities. This is used to identify the causal impact of the
reform at two points of the population distribution, and to explore both the short term
and long term impact of gender quotas.
Therefore, a data set that merges election results from four election cycles (2003, 2007,
2011 and 2015) with individual candidate data for those years was collected. With this
data set, a regression discontinuity design was used to uncover the causal impact of the
reform on women’s political position in Spain. This study found that the reform did in-
crease women’s political participation, measured as the percentage of female candidates.
However, this increase did not empower women. Parties allocated female candidates to
the lowest possible positions in their list such that they would still comply with the law.
Moreover, parties disproportionately allocated women to positions where the candidate
was not expected to win in the upcoming election. Because of political parties’ behavior,
the reform had quite a small impact in the proportion of women that were elected, and no
eect on the probability of a woman heading the list. Ultimately, the reform did not shift
public spending toward areas preferred by women.
The positive impacts associated with gender quotas legislation are stronger the year
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that these quotas become binding. However, they tend to diminish after two election
cycles and are smaller and sometimes not signicant by 2015. This is partly due to the
convergence of untreated municipalities, whose outcomes are improving over time, even
in the absence of the reform. Geographical data were used in order to test the hypothesis
that it was the reform itself that aected the growth and convergence of untreated munic-
ipalities. If this were the case, the reform would have been more successful than what it
appeared to be. A measure of how many neighbors are treated for each municipality was
constructed. It was found that the proportion of women outcomes did not increase when
municipalities were surrounded by more treated neighbors. If anything, in 2007, when
parties had less time to react to the reform, the number of women candidates decreases in
untreated municipalities. This could be due to treated municipalities “borrowing” female
candidates from adjacent counties where the reform is not in place.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics Women’s Political Representation
2003 2007 2011 2015
% Women Candidates 0.33 0.40 0.42 0.44
% Women Elected 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15
P(Woman |Position = 1) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
P(Woman |Realistic Position) 0.33 0.35 0.38
P(Woman |Irrelevant Candidates) 0.41 0.43 0.44
Returning Candidate 0 0.20 0.21 0.21
New Candidate 1 0.80 0.79 0.79
P(Woman |Position <4) 0.26 0.31 0.33 0.36
Position 7.06 7.22 7.46 7.62
Number of Candidates 205, 491 227, 261 235, 456 239, 390
Average Yearly Spending Pensions (log) 8.60 8.67 7.55
Average Yearly Spending Health (log) 8.92 8.65 7.54
Average Yearly Spending UI (log) 8.63 8.43 7.32
Population 3, 707 3, 942 4, 138 4, 190
Council Size 9.83 9.96 10.07 10.08
Turnout 0.66 0.64 0.61 0.58
Number Municipalities 5, 418 5, 368 5, 330 5, 245
Note: The level of observation is the individual candidate. All rows denote averages. The
sample is composed by candidates in municipalities with population between 1,000 and
10,000. Realistic positions are dened as positions in the list of the party that obtained a
seat in the previous election. Irrelevant positions are dened as positions in the list of the
party that did not obtain a seat in the previous election.
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Table 1.2: RD Estimates of the Impact of the Reform on the Proportion of Female
Candidates
Dependent variable:
% Female Candidates
2003 2007 2011 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Placebo Estimate. No Reform −0.009 −0.008
at Either Side of Threshold (0.011) (0.008)
Cuto 5000 3000
Main Eect. Reform 0.080∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
only on Right Side of Threshold (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Cuto 5000 3000 3000
Dynamic Impact. Reform Intensity 0.008 0.008
higher on Right Side of Threshold (0.012) (0.012)
Cuto 5000 5000
Population > 3000 Treated No No Yes Yes
Population > 5000 Treated No Yes Yes Yes
E (Y |Pop = 3000) 0.31 0.37 0.39 0.41
Observations 93,736 101,133 99,323 96,630
Note: The sample is composed by all candidates in municipalities with population
between 1,000 and 10,000. Displayed estimates are local polynomial Regression Dis-
continuity (RD) point estimators with a triangular kernel. Standard errors are cal-
culated using near neighbor technique. Bandwidth is set to 2000 in each side. The
dependent variable is the number of female candidates in all lists divided by the to-
tal number of candidates. Signicance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by ** and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.3: RD Estimates Women Realistic vs Irrelevant Positions
Dependent variable:
% Female Candidates
Realistic Positions Irrelevant Positions
2007 2011 2015 2007 2011 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Placebo Estimate. No Reform −0.024 −0.001
at Either Side of Threshold (0.019) (0.013)
Cuto 3000 3000
Main Eect. Reform 0.056∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.032 0.092∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
only on Right Side of Threshold (0.028) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015)
Cuto 5000 3000 3000 5000 3000 3000
Dynamic Impact. Reform Intensity 0.009 0.050∗ −0.002 −0.007
higher on Right Side of Threshold (0.028) (0.028) (0.018) (0.019)
Cuto 5000 5000 5000 5000
Population > 3000 Treated No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Population > 5000 Treated Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
E (Y |3000) 0.42 0.4 0.43 0.31 0.35 0.39
Observations 19,205 19,658 18,583 41,425 43,238 36,140
Note: The sample is composed by all candidates in municipalities with population between 1,000 and 10,000.
Displayed estimates are local polynomial Regression Discontinuity (RD) point estimators with a triangular
kernel. Standard errors are calculated using near neighbor technique. Bandwidth is set to 2000 in each
side. The dependent variable is the number of female candidates in all lists divided by the total number of
candidates. Signicance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by ** and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.4: RD Estimates on Women as Head of List and Women’s Election
Rates
Panel A: Dependent variable:
P (Woman|Position = 1)
2003 2007 2011 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Placebo Estimate. No Reform −0.016 0.008
at Either Side of Threshold (0.006) (0.005)
Cuto 5000 3000
Main Eect. Reform −0.002 −0.003 −0.007
only on Right Side of Threshold (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Cuto 5000 3000 3000
Dynamic Impact. Reform Intensity −0.001 0.002
higher on Right Side of Threshold (0.006) (0.006)
Cuto 5000 5000
E (Y |Pop = 3000) 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05
Observations 36,971 46,668 48,877 48,951
Panel B: Dependent variable:
P (Woman|Elected)
2003 2007 2011 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Placebo Estimate. No Reform −0.001 −0.025
at Either Side of Threshold (0.020) (0.016)
Cuto 5000 3000
Main Eect. Reform 0.052∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.021
only on Right Side of Threshold (0.017) (0.011) (0.017)
Cuto 5000 3000 3000
Dynamic Impact. Reform Intensity −0.000 0.029
higher on Right Side of Threshold (0.023) (0.023)
Cuto 5000 5000
E (Y |Pop = 3000) 0.29 0.34 0.35 0.4
Observations 25,903 26,776 26,789 26,242
Note: The sample is composed by all candidates in municipalities with population
between 1,000 and 10,000. Displayed estimates are local polynomial Regression
Discontinuity (RD) point estimators with a triangular kernel. Standard errors are
calculated using near neighbor technique. Bandwidth is set to 2000 in each side.
Dependent variable is the proportion of female candidates in the rst position of
a list for the rst panel, and the proportion of women among elected candidates
in the second. Signicance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by
** and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.5: RD Estimates Spending
Impact on Spending:
Panel A: Unemployment Insurance
2007 2011 2015
(1) (2) (3)
Placebo Estimate. No Reform 0.238
at Either Side of Threshold (0.181)
Main Eect. Reform 0.116 −0.125 −0..060
only on Right Side of Threshold (0.300) (0.245) (0.490)
Dynamic Impact. Reform Intensity −0.527∗ −0.468
higher on Right Side of Threshold (0.281) (0.394)
Observations 83,757 94,735 61,253
Panel B: Pensions
Placebo Estimate. No Reform −0.029
at Either Side of Threshold (0.201)
Main Eect. Reform −0.493 −0.372 −0.119
only on Right Side of Threshold (0.333) (0.249) (0.741)
Dynamic Impact. Reform Intensity −1.087∗∗∗ −0.215
higher on Right Side of Threshold (0.271) (0.908)
Observations 80,038 71,033 21,755
Panel C: Health
Placebo Estimate. No Reform 0.247
at Either Side of Threshold (0.176)
Main Eect. Reform −0.064 0.107 −0.232
only on Right Side of Threshold (0.246) (0.178) (0.230)
Dynamic Impact. Reform Intensity −0.137 0.253
higher on Right Side of Threshold (0.230) (0.284)
Observations 86,236 85,914 64,461
Note: Sample is composed by all candidates in municipalities with popu-
lation between 1,000 and 10,000 for which public spending data is avail-
able. Estimates are local polynomial Regression Discontinuity (RD) point
estimators with robust bias-corrected condence intervals. Signicance
at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by ** and at the 1%
level by ***.
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Table 1.6: Spillover Eects: Share of Treated Neighbors
Dependent variable:
% Women Candidates ∆t ,2003 % Women Candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Treated Neighbors x 2007 0.019 −0.061∗ 0.010 −0.062∗
(0.012) (0.037) (0.013) (0.037)
% Treated Neighbors x 2011 0.026 0.020 0.013 0.021
(0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024)
% Treated Neighbors x 2015 0.024 0.014 0.010 0.012
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 11,694 11,694 11,357 11,357
Adjusted R2 0.180 0.529 0.039 0.607
Note: The sample is composed by all municipalities non treated municipalities from 2007
to 2015. All regressions include population controls. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. The main independent variable is the share of bordering municipali-
ties that are subject to gender quotas in that election year. Signicance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by ** and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.7: RD Estimates on Candidates and Election Rates by Compliance Status
Dependent variable:
% Female Candidates
2003 Compliers 2003 Non Compliers
2007 2011 2015 2007 2011 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Placebo Estimate. No Reform −0.011 −0.015
at Either Side of Threshold (0.023) (0.012)
Cuto 3000 3000
Main Eect. Reform 0.024 0.059∗∗ 0.017 0.107∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
only on Right Side of Threshold (0.031) (0.025) (0.017) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Cuto 5000 3000 3000 5000 3000 3000
Dynamic Impact. Reform Intensity 0.019 0.007 0.004 0.019
higher on Right Side of Threshold (0.033) (0.033) (0.019) (0.019)
Cuto 5000 5000 5000 5000
E (Y |3000) 0.42 0.39 0.47 0.32 0.34 0.39
Observations 4,871 4,327 4,461 14,671 14,165 13,324
P (Woman|Elected)
Placebo Estimate. No Reform −0.002 −0.024
at Either Side of Threshold (0.041) (0.021)
Cuto 3000 3000
Main Eect. Reform 0.067 0.068∗ −0.021 0.63∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.040∗
only on Right Side of Threshold (0.042) (0.044) (0.031) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024)
Cuto 5000 3000 3000 5000 3000 3000
Dynamic Impact. Reform Intensity 0.045 0.028 0.007 0.052
higher on Right Side of Threshold (0.060) (0.060) (0.033) (0.034)
Cuto 5000 5000 5000 5000
E (Y |3000) 0.42 0.39 0.47 0.32 0.34 0.39
Observations 4,871 4,327 4,461 14,671 14,165 13,324
Note: The sample is composed by all candidates in municipalities with population between 1,000 and 10,000
for which political party can be linked over time. Displayed estimates are local polynomial Regression
Discontinuity (RD) point estimators with robust bias-corrected condence intervals. Signicance at the
10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by ** and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.8: RD Estimates on Type of Position by Compliance Status
Dependent variable:
P(Woman Realistic Position)
2003 Compliers 2003 Non Compliers
2007 2011 2015 2007 2011 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Placebo Estimate. No Reform −0.016 −0.017
at Either Side of Threshold (0.043) (0.023)
Cuto 3000 3000
Main Eect. Reform 0.064 0.067 −0.004 0.062∗ 0.043∗ 0.032
only on Right Side of Threshold (0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.034) (0.026) (0.028)
Cuto 5000 3000 3000 5000 3000 3000
Dynamic Impact. Reform Intensity 0.021 0.020 −0.003 0.058
higher on Right Side of Threshold (0.066) (0.069) (0.037) (0.039)
Cuto 5000 5000 5000 5000
E (Y |3000) 0.42 0.4 0.43 0.31 0.35 0.39
Observations 4,818 4,117 3,913 14,387 12,994 12,856
P(Woman Irrelevant Position)
Placebo Estimate. No Reform −0.017 −0.008
at Either Side of Threshold (0.020) (0.013)
Cuto 3000 3000
Main Eect. Reform 0.026 0.073∗∗∗ 0.031 0.115∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
only on Right Side of Threshold (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Cuto 5000 3000 3000 5000 3000 3000
Dynamic Impact. Reform Intensity 0.001 −0.003 −0.010 −0.007
higher on Right Side of Threshold (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009)
Cuto 5000 5000 5000 5000
E (Y |3000) 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.38 0.39 0.41
Observations 10,169 8,571 7,291 31,256 25,428 22,131
Note: The sample is composed by all candidates in municipalities with population between 1,000
and 10,000 for which political party can be linked over time. Displayed estimates are local polyno-
mial Regression Discontinuity (RD) point estimators with robust bias-corrected condence intervals.
Signicance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by ** and at the 1% level by ***.
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Figure 1·1: Possible Impact of Gender Quota Reform
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Note: The horizontal axis denotes time, with the vertical red line establishing the point at which
a theoretical reform would take place (t0). The vertical axis represents the outcome for which we
are interested in calculating the causal eect of the gender quota reform. ∆Y1 denotes the short
term impact of the reform, and ∆Y2 the long term impact.
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Figure 1·2: Council Size by Population
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Note: Figure shows the number of politicians elected for
each municipality (i.e. council size) depending on their
population. The horizontal axis is restricted to municipali-
ties with population higher than 250 and lower than 10,000.
The unit of observation is the municipality times election
year, for the period 2003-2015.
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Figure 1·3: Density of Population Around Thresh-
old
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Note: Both gures are histograms showing population density around
each of the gender quotas cutos. The unit of observation is the munic-
ipality times election year. The bin size of both histograms is set to 100.
The vertical red lines denote the treatment cutos.
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Figure 1·4: Number of Treated Neighboring Munic-
ipalities
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Note: Figure shows, for each municipality in my sample, the number of
neighboring municipalities that are subject to gender quotas for both the
2007 and the 2011 election cycle. I don’t observe municipalities under 250
population, but those are never treated by law, and are therefore consid-
ered as such.
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Figure 1·5: Proportion of Women Candidates by Year
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(d) 2015
Note: Unit of observation is the candidate. Sample is composed by all candidates in municipalities
with population between 1,000 and 8,000. The vertical lines denote the population cutos that
determine treatment status. Each dot represents an average of the outcome variable in a bin of
size 100 of population. The blue and red lines denote local polynomial regression tted lines with
loess method. The color denotes the treatment status for those municipalities in that year: blue for
non treated, red when gender quotas are binding.
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Figure 1·6: Proportion of Women Candidates by Position
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Note: Unit of observation is the candidate. Sample is composed by all candidates in municipalities
with population between 1,000 and 8,000. Each bar denotes the proportion of candidates that are
women at each position in the list. The dashed vertical lines denotes the ve position bracket
cutos. The color of the bar denotes the treatment status for those municipalities in that year: red
for non treated, blue when gender quotas are binding.
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Figure 1·7: Proportion of Women Elected by Position
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Note: Unit of observation is the candidate. Sample is composed by all candidates in municipalities
with population between 1,000 and 8,000. Each bar denotes the proportion of candidates that are
women at each position in the list. The dashed vertical lines denotes the ve position bracket
cutos. The color of the bar denotes the treatment status for those municipalities in that year: red
for non treated, blue when gender quotas are binding.
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Figure 1·8: Proportion of Women Elected by Year
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Note: Unit of observation is the candidate. Sample is composed by all candidates in municipalities
with population between 1,000 and 8,000. The vertical lines denote the population cutos that
determine treatment status. Each dot represents an average of the outcome variable in a bin of
size 100 of population. The blue and red lines denote local polynomial regression tted lines with
loess method. The color denotes the treatment status for those municipalities in that year: blue for
non treated, red when gender quotas are binding.
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Figure 1·9: Proportion of Women in Realistic Positions
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
ll l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.2
0.4
0.6
1000 3000 5000 7000
Population
P(
Wo
m
a
n
 | E
xp
ec
ted
 W
inn
er)
(a) 2007
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
0.2
0.4
0.6
1000 3000 5000 7000
Population
P(
Wo
m
a
n
 | E
xp
ec
ted
 W
inn
er)
(b) 2011
l
l ll
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
0.2
0.4
0.6
1000 3000 5000 7000
Population
P(
Wo
m
a
n
 | E
xp
ec
ted
 W
inn
er)
(c) 2015
Note: Unit of observation is the candidate. Sample is composed by all candidates in municipalities
with population between 1,000 and 8,000. The vertical lines denote the population cutos that
determine treatment status. Each dot represents an average of the outcome variable in a bin of
size 100 of population. The blue and red lines denote local polynomial regression tted lines with
loess method. The color denotes the treatment status for those municipalities in that year: blue for
non treated, red when gender quotas are binding.
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Figure 1·10: Proportion of Women in Irrelevant Positions
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Note: Unit of observation is the candidate. Sample is composed by all candidates in municipalities
with population between 1,000 and 8,000. The vertical lines denote the population cutos that
determine treatment status. Each dot represents an average of the outcome variable in a bin of
size 100 of population. The blue and red lines denote local polynomial regression tted lines with
loess method. The color denotes the treatment status for those municipalities in that year: blue for
non treated, red when gender quotas are binding.
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Figure 1·11: Evolution of the Percentage of Women
Candidates by 2003 Party Complier Status
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Note: Unit of observation is the candidate. Sample is composed by all
candidates in municipalities with population between 1,000 and 8,000 for
which political party can be linked over time. Each graph corresponds to
candidates in municipalities of a dierent population bracket. Municipal-
ities with population lower than 3000 are never treated. Municipalities
with population higher than 3000 and lower than 5000 are subject to gen-
der quotas starting in 2011. Municipalities with population higher than
5000 are subject to gender quotas starting in 2007. Each dot represents
the proportion of women candidates in that type of municipality and year.
The color denotes whether candidates belong to a party that was already
in compliance with the gender quotas in 2003 or not.
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Figure 1·12: Evolution of the Percentage of Women
Elected by 2003 Party Complier Status
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Note: Unit of observation is the candidate. Sample is composed by all
candidates in municipalities with population between 1,000 and 8,000 for
which political party can be linked over time. Each graph corresponds to
candidates in municipalities of a dierent population bracket. Municipal-
ities with population lower than 3000 are never treated. Municipalities
with population higher than 3000 and lower than 5000 are subject to gen-
der quotas starting in 2011. Municipalities with population higher than
5000 are subject to gender quotas starting in 2007. Each dot represents
the proportion of women that are elected in that type of municipality and
year. The color denotes whether candidates belong to a party that was
already in compliance with the gender quotas in 2003 or not.
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Chapter 2
The More the Merrier: Evidence of
Misreporting Population for Political
Gain by Spanish Municipalities
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between scal and political institutions has long been of interest to
economists (Alesina and Perotti (1999)). We have long theorized about the optimal govern-
ment size, and the consequences of dierent degrees of scal federalism and political de-
centralization. One inuential public choice theory, developed by Brennan and Buchanan
(Brennan and Buchanan (1977), Brennan and Buchanan (1978), Brennan, Buchanan et al.
(1980)) is the Leviathan model of government. According to this model, the goal of bu-
reaucrats is to maximize the size of the government. There are two constraints to the
Leviathan behavior of governments: constitutional constraints and intergovernmental
competition. In this paper, I show, rst, that Leviathan behavior is present in Spanish
municipal elections, and second, that local governments circumvent constitutional con-
straints by manipulating population gures to maximize council size.
Elites and politicians using demographic manipulation to gain political inuence is
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not new behavior. The landowners and peers who controlled “rotten boroughs” in 18th
century England, for example, bribed the electors of these underpopulated constituencies
in order to send their preferred candidate to the House of Commons. In the modern United
States, district boundaries are manipulated (Gerrymandered) in order to obtain the desired
demographic electoral composition. This paper provides evidence of direct manipulation
of population reporting by Spanish ocials to increase the size of the government.
Most of the economic literature that studies the relationship between political institu-
tions and scal policy has focused on the impact of government size on public spending.
In the United States1, economists have focused on the eect of the mayor’s council or
council manager on scal policy2. Coate and Knight (2011) nd that US municipalities
governed by city councils have lower public spending. MacDonald (2008) tests for the
eect of council size on public spending, nding none once xed eects are included.
Outside the US, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) analyzes two natural experiments and nds
that an increase in council size is associated with a decrease in government spending in
Finland and Sweden.
This examines how municipalities circumvent constitutional and regulation constraints
that dictate council size in local municipalities in Spain. Spain is particularly interesting
due to its high degree of decentralization. According to Fernández-Caballero, Pedregal,
and Pérez (2011), close to 50% of all government spending is managed by regional or local
governments in Spain. Local elections in Spain have previously been studied in the liter-
ature, but with a slightly dierent focus. Costas-Pérez, Ollé, and Navarro (2011) account
for the eect of corruption scandals on the probability of Spanish mayors’ reelection. Of
closer relevance to this project, Curto Grau, Solé Ollé, and Sorribas (2012) study the par-
1A comprehensive review of the literature can be found in Besley and Case (2003)
2Another political institution that economists have studied is tenure in oce. (Coviello and Gagliarducci,
2010) exploit a natural experiment in Italy to study the relationship between tenure and economic outcomes.
They nd that longer tenure is associated with worse economic outcomes.
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tisan targeting of government transfers. The authors nd that transfers to a municipality
are higher when the political sign of the local government is the same as the state or
national government.
The main results of this paper are as follows: rst, there is an unusual concentration
of municipalities (bunching) with reported populations just above the threshold that in-
creases the number of local representatives. Second, I present compelling evidence that
elected ocials manipulate population gures in order to maximize the size of the council
in the upcoming election. In particular, municipalities are twice more likely to be found
right after the threshold during election years compared to non election times. Also, it
does not seem to be the case that what drives municipalities to bunch and misreport their
population gures is the desire to obtain more responsibilities, or a higher degree of polit-
ical decentralization. I also present evidence that transfers do not change discontinuously
at the threshold that determines council size. Finally, I use luminosity data to construct
a measure of misreporting and nd that municipalities that have higher turnout tend to
have higher levels of misreporting.
In its methodology, this paper is closer to the literature on bunching. This literature
was developed initially by Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2009) and Saez (2010),
who study whether workers bunch at kink points of the income tax bracket, where there
is a discontinuity in the marginal tax rate. There is less available literature on the re-
lationship between bunching and local governments. Perhaps the best study to date in
this area is Camacho and Conover (2011). The authors study how local governments in
Colombia manipulate a poverty index in order to stay below a certain threshold that deter-
mines whether households in that municipality obtain state funds. Outside the bunching
literature, the relationship between local government and corruption has also been ex-
plored: see Bergh, Fink, and Öhrvall (2012) in the context of Sweden, and Olken (2006) in
Indonesia.
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This paper also contributes to the literature of Regression Discontinuity Designs using
population thresholds. Several papers (for instance (Bagues and Campa, 2017), (Campa,
2011), (Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2015)) use this cutos without taking into consideration that
municipalities misreport their population gures. If misreporting is not random, as shown
in this paper, and the characteristics of the bunching municipalities are correlated with
the outcomes of interest in those papers, the estimated eects might be biased.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the Spanish in-
stitutional setting, the particular law analyzed and the identication strategy. Section 3
details the data used, and Section 4 shows the main results of the paper. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Setting
Politically, Spain is organized into autonomous communities, provinces and municipal-
ities. Municipalities constitute the lowest level of territorial division. There are 8,112
municipalities, all of which hold elections simultaneously every four years, usually the
fourth Sunday of May, via a multi-party proportional list system. In every election, more
than sixty-six thousand local representatives are elected. The mayor is then elected by
the plenary assembly of these representatives. Spanish local governments are in charge
of basic services, such as lighting public spaces, waste collection and management and
water supply. Their revenue comes, mostly, from local taxes, income from self-owned
assets, subsidies, and transfers from the central and autonomous government.
In this study, I am interested in the legislation that regulates how many politicians will
be elected in the upcoming election. According to the law governing municipal elections,
the number of representatives assigned to a municipality is determined by that munici-
pality’s population. Specically the “Ley Orgánica 5/1985 del Régimen Electoral General"
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states the following: if the population in the municipality is of less than or equal to 100
people, the municipality is assigned three representatives. If the municipality has more
than 100 and less than 250 inhabitants, ve local representatives will be chosen, and so on.
The full assignment rule can be seen in Table 2.1 and Figure 2·1. For municipalities whose
population is higher than one hundred thousand, one representative is added for each ad-
ditional hundred thousand people. If the result is an even number, another representative
is assigned.
Given the ndings of this paper, it is crucial to understand the process by which pop-
ulation is reported. Every 10 years, a national Census is carried out by the National In-
stitute of Statistics (INE). Due to its low frequency, however, the Census is not enough to
assign representatives. During the years in which a Census is not available, municipalities
are in charge of creating the “Padrón Municipal" or Municipal register. According to the
National Institute of Statistics: “the Municipal register is the administrative register where
municipality inhabitants are recorded. The respective town councils are responsible for the
register’s formation, maintenance, revision and custody. Its update is obtained from the re-
vision of the municipal register on the 1st of January of each year, which is approved by the
Government at the INE’s request, after a favorable report by the Registration Board". Munic-
ipalities are in charge of the maintenance, creation and revision of the Padrón, while the
National Institute of Statistics oversees that the reported numbers are correct. In 1996,
there was a major modication of register regulations: “a new continuous and computer-
ized management system for municipal registers was established, based on the coordination
of all of them by the National Statistical Institute". I will show that whether population
is measured through a National Census or Municipal Padrón matters. I nd that there is
only manipulation when the local governments are the ones reporting population gures.
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2.3 Data
The data set I compile includes information on Spanish municipalities’ elections and their
economic outcomes over time. As of 2014, Spain has a total of 8,122 municipalities. The
rst democratic municipal elections in Spain took place in 1979. Local representatives and
mayors are chosen every four years.
The data set on local elections contains results from 1987 to 2011, a period of seven
elections for each of the Spanish municipalities. This data is publicly available at the
Ministerio del Interior (Spanish Ministry of Interior). The data set contains information on
the number of votes for each party, as well as the total number of votes and the population
of each municipality. Population gures are used to assign the number of seats or local
representatives that each municipality will elect. The method for allocating seats is known
as D’Hondt method. Given that the number of votes for each party and the total number of
seats are known, I can back out the number of seats that each political party is assigned.
In elections where the most voted party obtains more than 50% of the seats, the rst
candidate on that party’s list becomes mayor. There is never a case in which the winning
party obtains exactly 50% of the seats, because the number of seats is always odd. To
identify the mayor’s party, which is not trivial in cases where there is a coalition, since it
is not necessarily the party with the most votes, I use a second data set that contains a list
of mayors for each municipality and election. This data is also available at the Ministerio
del Interior.
The average municipality has a population of around 5,000, although the median pop-
ulation is closer to six hundred. As we can infer from Table 2.2, Spain has gone through
a process of urbanization in the last two decades, with people moving from small rural
areas to cities. Consequently, the distribution of population has become more skewed,
with large population centers growing even larger over time, and smaller municipalities
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becoming smaller.
In Table ??, I include a summary of important political outcomes. Close to three parties
obtain representation in the council on average. Turnout for local elections is high, around
60%. The winning party (in terms of votes) usually achieves two thirds of the seats, and
the probability of a majority is 80%. This is due to the D’Hondt allocation method, which
makes each consecutive seat "cheaper" to obtain. In a multi party system, it is dicult to
construct a measure of the margin of victory. A proxy for that is the dierence in vote
shares between rst and second most voted parties. On average, the share of votes by the
winning party is 26% higher than that of the runner up. Finally, I include two dummy
variables that measure how prevalent one and two party councils are. These are dened
as councils where only one (two) party is represented. One party councils are present in
11% of the municipalities, whereas two party councils are more common, and compose
36% of the sample.
When investigating the motives for misreporting population, I consider the possibility
that higher transfers is the reason for this behavior. To study this hypothesis, I combine
the electoral results data set with annual data on each municipality’s budget from 1985 to
2009. This second data set, provided by the Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones
Públicas, contains information on the total public spending and revenue of each munici-
pality. It also breaks down spending and revenue into subcategories. Public spending is
thus divided into the following subcategories: spending in personnel, services, infrastruc-
ture, transfers, nancial expenses and nancial assets. Revenue subcategories include: di-
rect and indirect taxes, fees, transfers received, sale of assets, nancial revenue and public
debt. Overall, I am able to link 21,461 elections with budget data.
A summary of public spending and public revenue is included in Table 2.4. The main
spending categories are personnel, general services and infrastructure, together constitut-
ing more than 85% of total spending. Because of this, combined with the fact that these are
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the areas where municipalities enjoy a higher degree of discretion, I will be focusing on
these three categories in the empirical analysis. The major revenue streams for these mu-
nicipalities are direct taxes, fees, capital transfers and transfers from other public entities,
such as Autonomous Communities and the Spanish central government.
Finally, in order to create an unbiased measure of misreporting, I match my data of mu-
nicipalities’ electoral results and public spending with the Defense Meteorological Satel-
lite Program’s luminosity data. This data, available worldwide for the period 1992 to 2013,
contains measures of nighttime lights visible from space. Night lights are measured at a
very small grid (30 arc seconds grid, or approximately 1 kilometer) and are bottom and
top coded. My measure of luminosity for a municipality in a given year is the sum of the
average yearly night light measure in each grid inside that municipality. Since I am trying
to obtain an unbiased measure of population, the sum seems to be a better choice than
the average.
In Figure 2·2, I illustrate the geographic distribution of night lights and their evolution
over time with two heat maps. The rst one shows the deciles of night lights in Spain in
1995, and the second one in 2011. Brighter areas represent areas with higher population
or night light measures. As we can see, they generally track population, since the capital
and the coast tend to be brighter, as well, as areas in the interior having lower population.
Finally, the luminosity measure is getting brighter over time, consistent with a positive
population growth.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Evidence of Political Bunching
In this section, I present the results of this paper. Following the potential framework
econometric literature, I want to dene the treatment (D) as follows:
Di =

1 if Treated (Above Threshold)
0 if Control (Below Threshold)
In this case, I have eight dierent discontinuities or thresholds (RD1, ...,RD8) at which
point an extra representative is assigned. However, it seems reasonable to assume that
the relevant threshold for each municipality is the closest one. If the cost of misreporting
(or the probability of getting caught) increases in the distance between true population
and reported population, then the only relevant threshold to a municipality is the one
closest to them. Therefore, I dene a new forcing variable, “distance to the threshold",
Z , that measures the distance, in percentage terms, to the closest discontinuity (RD∗).
The choice of percentage rather than absolute distance can be discussed. Suppose your
municipality is 100 people short of the threshold: I believe it is plausible that the cost
of misreporting and adding 100 people to your population registry is much lower for a
highly populated municipality than a smaller one. On the other hand, the cost of adding
5% of your population could potentially be roughly similar independent of population
levels, considered in terms of the probability of getting caught by the National Institute
of Statistics. Following that reasoning, the new forcing variable Z denes the treatment
(being above the closest discontinuity) as:
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Z =
population − RD∗
RD∗
RD∗ = argmin
RD1,...,RD8
population − RDkRDk

Given that forcing variable, the treatment is just a function of the distance between
the reported population and the nearest discontinuity. That means that all municipalities
with a positive (negative) Z are closer to a discontinuity “from the left" (“from the right"):
for my analysis, they will count as those who obtained extra representatives to be elected
in council.
Di =

1 if Z > 0
0 if Z ≤ 0
The main result of this paper is shown in Figure 2·3. In this graph, each point repre-
sents the number of municipalities in a small bandwidth of the forcing variable Z . The
blue line shows a quadratic t for the relationship between density and the distance to the
threshold. As we can observe, right after Z = 0, there is an unusual spike in the number
of municipalities.
One naive explanation would be that, when reporting population, municipalities tend
to choose round numbers. However, if that were the case, bunching would be seen at
the left of the discontinuity, since the law stipulates that additional representatives are
awarded when the population reaches 101, 251, 1,001 and so forth.
Stronger evidence that it is indeed the municipalities who are misreporting popula-
tion gures is shown in Figure 2·4. This gure shows the distribution of municipalities for
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each election cycle. According to this Figure, there is no bunching in 1991. This fact actu-
ally strengthens the theory of political manipulation, since in 1991 there was a decennial
national Census. This means that the National Institute of Statistics (INE) was the one
reporting population gures. In another project, I take advantage of this fact to estimate
the causal impact of government size on public spending and electoral outcomes. Every
other year, it is up to the local municipalities to approve those numbers. As previously
mentioned, a modication of the Padrón regulations was carried out in 1996. However,
it does not appear that such modications were successful in preventing municipalities
from misreporting population: bunching is still evident in 1999 (Figure 2·4d), less so in
2003 (Figure 2·4e) but very clear again in 2007 (Figure 2·4f).
I reinforce the previous argument in Figure 2·5 and Table 2.5. The gure shows the
amount on bunching on Census years (2011, 1991) versus the rest, where population was
reported by the municipalities. As we can see, bunching is way more prevalent in non
Census years. I can formalize this in a regression framewrok: in Table 2.5, I regress
whether a municipality is found right above their nearest threshold, dened as within 5%
above the threshold on whether the election happened on a year where a National Cen-
sus was taking place. I control for population and distance to the discontinuity, as well as
municipality and year xed eects. Clustered standard errors at the municipality level are
shown in parentheses. The results indicate that bunching is way less prevelant in years
where a Census took place, conrming the visual evidence shown before.
2.4.2 Alternative Hypothesis
In this section, I will discuss some alternative hypotheses of what could motivate munic-
ipalities to misreport population gures above these particular thresholds. One possible
explanation is that municipalities are indeed choosing to misreport population gures,
but that they are doing so with no political gain in mind. This could be the case if they are
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trying to get over a particular population threshold in order to obtain any other privileges
(grants, transfers from other government level, additional responsibilities...). There are a
couple of things that can be done to alleviate those concerns.
First, tables 2.6 and 2.7 show the level of bunching in election versus non election
years. If municipalities are misreporting population gures for motives other than elec-
toral ones, there should be no dierential spike in election years. To test this hypothesis,
I focus on the sample of municipalities that are above the discontinuity for the years 2000
to 2014. The reason for choosing municipalities only above the threshold is comparabil-
ity: all of these local governments have obtained extra council seats, so that eliminates
one confounding variable. I use a linear probability model to estimate the probability of
reporting population gures just above the threshold:
1{Right Above}it = γElection Yeart + βXit + u if ‖Zit ‖ < ϵ (2.1)
The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the variable is right
above the discontinuity, where bunching is observed. I determines that threshold graph-
ically to be either 0.01 or 0.02%. Results are reported for the smallest interval, but robust
to either. The main independent variable is a dummy for if a local election was held that
year. The results show that the probability of any municipality reporting population right
above the threshold is much higher during an election year that a non election year. In
particular, the estimates suggest that the probability of a municipality reporting popula-
tion levels right above the threshold jumps 50 to 150% in an election year. Results are
robust to whether we restrict the sample to municipalities below within 5% or 1% of the
threshold, or to the controls included (population or year xed eects). This is further
evidence of politically-motivated manipulation of the population gures.
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Second, another possible motive for manipulation is tied to the fact that the level of
decentralization changes at some of those thresholds. Whereas all municipalities have
some basic responsibilities (street lightning, waste collection, water supply, road manage-
ment), according to Spanish law, those responsibilities increase with the population of the
municipality. Local councils in municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants must also
provide public parks, public libraries and waste treatment; municipalities with more than
20,000 inhabitants must oer social services, re ghters and a slaughterhouse. Finally,
those with population levels over 50,000 are required to provide public transportation
and environmental protection. It could be the case that local councils choose to misreport
population in order to obtain additional responsibilities: if politicians are corrupt, and em-
bezzlement, theft or nepotism are easier when the size of the local government increases,
it could be optimal for them to misreport population. If that is the main reason for the
observed bunching, however, we should only observe a spike in density right after those
three thresholds, and not in the rest. The opposite could also be true: if municipalities’
ocials are time constrained and/or dislike work, they could instead desire less respon-
sibilities. In that case, we would expect less bunching, or even bunching at the other side
of the cuto when responsibilities increase.
I test that hypothesis in Figure 2·6. In this gure, I compare the level of bunching when
a) both the number of representatives and the level of decentralization increases and b)
when only the size of the council increases. It can be observed that there is bunching in
both situations. This seems to dismiss the hypothesis that municipalities are bunching in
order to extract rents from more responsibilities.
Finally, I test the hypothesis that municipalities choose these population gures be-
cause they could potentially obtain more transfers from other levels of government by
getting over certain population thresholds. One naive test would be to compare trans-
fers below and above the cuto using a Regression Discontinuity design. However, this
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would be a useless exercise. First, I have just shown that population is not exogenous:
ocials are misreporting population gures, so any comparison of municipalities above
and below the threshold would compare dierent types of observations. Second of all, in
election years, the ceteris paribus assumption does not hold. Even if municipalities where
not misreporting population, council size increases at those thresholds. Then it would be
impossible to know whether transfers change because population changes, or because the
number of representatives in the local council rises.
However, I can test this hypothesis by focusing on the year 2001. The reason for this
is twofold. First, 2001 is one of the years in which a National Census took place. This
means that population reports should be accurate and unmanipulated. We can check this
by using the McCrary test. Second, there were no municipal elections in 2001, but there
were in 1999 and 2003. This implies that there is no change in council size from moving
above or below the threshold. Therefore, it is plausible to compare municipalities above
and below the threshold, as long as I control for whether they were above or below in
1999. If grants or other sources of public funds vary discontinuously at those thresholds,
we can measure that with a Regression Discontinuity design.
I test the hypothesis of no manipulation by plotting the density of the forcing variable
(distance to the discontinuity) in the year 2001 and performing the McCrary test. Figure ??
shows that we can’t reject the null of no manipulation. Together with the knowledge that
there was a National Census in 2001, there is reasonable evidence to trust the results
regression 2.2. In this regression, the dependent variable is the amount of transfers per
capita in a particular municipality. The parameter of interest is γ1, whether transfers
change signicantly whether a municipality is above the threshold (in 2001). I control for
whether the municipality was above the threshold in the previous election (1999), as well
as exibly for distance to the discontinuity, population and discontinuity dummies. Each
column represents a dierent bandwidth of observations: 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25%.
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Transfersi = γ1{Right Above}i + γ1{Right Above 1999}i + f (Zi ) + X ′i β + ui if ‖Zi ‖ < ϵ
(2.2)
The results in Table 2.8 show that transfers per capita do not change substantially at
the threshold in 2001. This seems to indicate that perhaps capture of transfers are not the
main driver behind the behavior of these municipalities. The eects for the 1999 dummy
are negative and sometimes statistically signicant. However, it should be remembered
there is no causal interpretation here: municipalities do manipulate population in 1999.
To conclude, it seems that politicians are indeed manipulating population in order
to increase the number of seats in local councils in the next election. This is consistent
with models of corruption where the goal of the party is to maximize the number of
representatives it obtains, not the number of votes.
2.4.3 Determinants of Misreporting
So far, we have established that local governments are over-reporting population gures.
I have shown that this is probably due to political motives, given that over-reporting is
greater during election years, and it is not due to a desire for higher decentralization, nor
to capture transfers. In this nal section, the aim is to understand when misreporting
happens, and which municipalities are more likely to engage in this type of behavior.
In the bunching literature, determinants of dierent kinds of behavior that result in
bunching observations bunching are usually explored. The methodology is simple, and
it involves regressing a dummy for whether a particular observation is in the bunching
area on a set of observables. Here, we can test whether bunching is more or less preva-
lent given a set of measures of the democratic health in that particular municipality. In
particular, to measure the democratic institutions in a municipality I use the following
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variables: turnout, probability of majority, percentage of seats obtained by the winning
party, the vote dierential between winner and runner up, the share of protest votes and
the number of parties that obtain representation in the council. I run the regression for
the whole sample in the rst column, and comparing those right above (the ones suspect
of misreporting) to those in the next bin (with distance greater than 5% and less than 10%).
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
The results of this test are shown in Table ??. The rst main take away is that bunching
is more likely to occur in municipalities with worse democratic outcomes: lower levels of
turnout, and higher degree of protest votes, both signals of an unhappy electorate. One
could be tempted to argue that the positive coecient on majority means that bunching
is more likely when there is a dominant party, but that is at least partially oset by the
impact on the number of seats obtained by the rst party, which is negative.
This approach, while oering some interesting hypothesis, does not work particularly
well in this scenario. This is because the behavior of interest is misreporting, not bunch-
ing. When I created a dummy for whether a municipality is just above the threshold, that
dummy encompasses two types of municipalities: those that happen to be just above the
threshold because of their “natural" population, and those who misreport their population
gures in order to increase council size in the next election. The inability to distinguish
between those two types of municipalities makes the results shown in Table ?? less clear.
To address this problem, I propose obtaining an unbiased measure of population us-
ing luminosity data and census years population gures. The rationale for using census
year population gures is that it seems like misreporting was not present in those years.
Therefore, I can use 1991, 2001 and 2011 population reports to infer what the actual pop-
ulation was on years where misreporting takes place. In addition, I propose using yearly
night lights measures to improve the accuracy of the imputation method. Luminosity
data has long been used as a measure of population density, particularly in developing
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countries. Based on these two set of variables I will obtain an estimate of “true" (as in
opposite of reported) population. I can then create measures of misreporting, and nd the
characteristics of the municipalities that are more likely to display misreporting behavior.
For this strategy to be valid, I will need to make four assumptions. First, only munic-
ipalities near the threshold misreport population. The assumption is that, for municipal-
ities “far away" from the threshold, the reported population is the true one. If there are
only gains to be had by going over the threshold, and it is costly to misreport, it is not
protable to misreport unless it is done in order to be over the discontinuity. This assump-
tion is violated if municipalities have imprecise control over the reported population, or if
there are other unobserved bunching points. I need this assumption to correctly estimate
the relationship between night lights and population. Second, there was no misreporting
in Census years. This allows me to use 1991, 2001 and 2011 population levels as a signal of
other years’ true population. I have already shown evidence that there bunching is way
less severe at the threshold during these years, since National Censuses were carried out.
Third, past luminosity data is a good predictor of population. Given this testable assump-
tion, I will use average night light measures in a municipality in each of the previous three
years as a predictor of population in election year. It is important to note that I will not
use contemporaneous measures of night lights. I choose not to do this due to endogeneity
issues: the measure of night lights could increase due to the behavior of elected ocials or
public spending decisions that might be correlated with possible manipulation. Finally, I
need to assume that the relationship between night lights and population in Census years
with current population is the same for those near the discontinuity and those that are
not. This is a critical non testable identifying assumption. It would be violated if mu-
nicipalities near the discontinuity are dierent in some dimension that makes them have
dierent measures of night lights compared to equally sized municipalities far away from
the discontinuity. If satised, this assumption allows me to impute predicted populations
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to municipalities suspect of “cheating", based on a relationship established for those those
far away from the discontinuity.
If the previous assumptions are met, I can think of manipulation of population gures
(or, for simplicityZ , since population uniquely determinesZ ) as a problem of non-classical
measurement error, where the econometrician does not observe the true population (Z ∗),
only the reported one:
Zit =

Z ∗it + uit for those Right After the Discontinuity
Z ∗it otherwise
It is important to note that the error term uit is not necessarily white noise. In partic-
ular, we expect uit to be correlated with other municipality characteristics, observed and
unobserved, such as public spending or corruption. This is not a problem for this pro-
cedure. The idea is to think of population as a function of 1991 population and previous
measure of night lights, estimate that relationship and then use those estimates to impute
an unbiased measure of “true population". Based on that measure, I can then construct
the estimated true distance to the nearest threshold Zˆ ∗it .
Populationit = ft (Populationi,1991, Populationi,2001,
Populationi,2011,Night Lightsi,t−1,
Night Lightsi,t−2,Night Lightsi,t−3)
In order to determine the best imputation procedure, I use dierent techniques from
the machine learning literature. Independently of the actual technique used, the imputa-
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tion is performed outside of the so called “excluded region". The excluded region is chosen
visually and, consistent to the gures where bunching was estimated, it is determined to
be all observations with distance to the nearest threshold smaller than 5%. Therefore, I re-
strict my sample to observations not on the excluded region. The rest of the observations
are again split into two further subsamples: a training set with two thirds of the leftover
observations, and a validation set with the other third. On that training set I estimate
nine dierent imputation procedures. First, a simple OLS regression is used, since it’s
been usually found that OLS is best at capturing linear relationships. I run an OLS model
with the four variables of interest. Secondly, we repeat the rst exercise including second
and third degree polynomials of the four variables of interest to try to capture non lin-
earities. Third, it has been shown that random forests are quite ecient at capturing non
linearities, so I estimate a random forest where the number of trees is set to half of the size
of the training set. Finally, in a spirit similar to ensemble learning techniques, I combine
the random forest predictions and the OLS predictions. The rationale is that this method
should excel at capturing both linear relationships and non linearities present in the data
generating process. The four estimation procedures are then applied to the validation set.
To compare among them, I calculate the mean square error of each method (the average
of the square of the dierence between population and estimated population).
The results of the imputation procedure are shown in Table ??. According to that
table, the random forest procedure yields the lower mean square error out of sample, so I
use that method to impute population. The relationship between reported population and
estimated population is shown in Figure 2·7. We can see that the estimation works best for
lower levels of population (below 30,000). However, given that most of the discontinuities
happen below those levels of population, this is not a concern for our analysis.
At this point, I “observe" both the reported population of the municipalities, as well as
their “true" population. Based on those, I observe the percentage distance of the disconti-
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nuity, reported and estimated: Zit , and Zˆ ∗it . Given these, I propose creating two measures
that will try to capture misreporting. The rst, and most natural one, is the dierence
between the reported population and the population that I estimate should be the truth.
The second one, that I denote Over-reporter is a dummy variable that takes a value of one
if the population reported by the municipality is higher than the estimated one.
Both variables try to capture the same concept: which municipalities are misreport-
ing. Now I can regress these variables on a series of outcomes measuring the democratic
health of the institutions. The explanatory variables that I choose are the following. Note,
all of them are calculated for the previous election period, since that is the information
that parties have when they decide to manipulate population reports. First: turnout. How
involved are voters in the democratic process could aect whether parties feel comfort-
able enough to manipulate population gures or not. To calculate turnout, I divide total
number of votes in the previous election period by 1991 population, since non census year
population reports are unreliable. Second, a dummy for whether there was a majority in
the previous election: if a single political party enjoys a majority, it could be easier to
manipulate as well as reap the benets of the extra council. The last three variables try to
explore this mechanism as well: the percentage of seats obtained by the winning party,
the dierence in vote shares between the winning and the second party, and the number
of parties that obtain representation.
The results are shown in Table 2.10. The most reliable results are shown in columns
2 and 4. In these two columns I restrict the sample to those observations in the bunch-
ing region (they are above the discontinuity, but their distance is lower than 5%). The
intuition here is to compare municipalities in the suspect region by their predicted popu-
lation. Those whose predicted population is lower than their reported one, how are they
dierent than the rest? The results show that of the included variables, only two have a
consistently signicant impact on whether municipalities misreport population. The rst
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is turnout in the previous election: the higher the turnout, the more higher the probability
of misreporting by that municipality. This is counterintuitive, but it seems to be a strong
eect. Second, the higher the number of parties obtaining seats in the previous election,
the lower the probability of misreporting. This does indeed support our prior: the more
parties, the higher accountability, and a lower potential benet from misreporting.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the behavioral response of local governments in Spain to the regulation
that dictates the number of representatives to be elected in the next local election. Using
data from all local elections held in Spain between 1987 and 2007, I nd that municipalities
bunch right after the discontinuities where additional representatives are awarded. This
is consistent evidence with Leviathan behavior from Spanish local governments.
Bunching is present in every election year except for 1991. During 1991, a National
Census was carried out. As a consequence, this is the only year in our sample in which
the role of reporting population is taken away from local governments and is assigned to
the National Institute of Statistics. It seems likely, then, that local governments and local
politicians are actually misreporting population gures. My hypothesis is that they are
doing so in order to maximize the number of representatives in local council, as predicted
by Leviathan model of government.
To support the hypothesis that misreporting is carried out by political agents, I present
several pieces of evidence: rst, bunching is more likely to occur in election versus non
election years. The probability of a municipality reporting population right after the
threshold is 50-150% higher in an election than a non election year. Second, at some
of the thresholds, the level of decentralization changes, i.e. municipalities have more re-
sponsibilities. However, bunching is still observed both at thresholds where the level of
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decentralization increases and remains constant, proving that this is not the main reason
why municipalities misreport population. Finally, I use the year 2001, when another Na-
tional Census took place and there was no election, to show that transfers do not change
discontinuously at the threshold that determines council size. This is compelling evidence
that misreporting is not taking place simply to capture higher transfers from other levels
of government.
Finally, I try to better understand which conditions bread misreporting. I use machine
learning techniques to create a measure of misreporting based on census population data
and luminosity gures. Given this unbiased estimate of population, and the reported
population, I construct two measures of misreporting. Based on both measures, I nd that
municipalities with higher voter participation in the previous election are more likely to
misreport, and that municipalities where more parties were involved in the council are
less likely to misreport.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 2·1: Assignment Rule of Representatives
 7
 9
11
13
17
21
25
250 1000 2000 5000 10000 20000 50000
Population
Co
un
cil
 S
ize
Note: Figure shows the number of politicians elected for each municipality
(i.e. council size) as a function of the population. Population is displayed
in log scale.
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Figure 2·2: Evolution of Night Lights in Spain over Time
(a) Deciles of Night Lights in 1995
(b) Deciles of Night Lights in 2011
Note: The unit of observation is the municipality. Each map displays the decile of both night lights
for the year 1995 and 2011. Brighter colors denote a higher decile of luminosity of population.
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Figure 2·3: Count of Municipalities by Distance to the Discontinuity
Estimated Bunching = 0.2 
 95% CI = [0.17,0.24]
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Note: The unit of observation is the municipality. Each dot displays the number of municipalities
in a bin of 1% of distance to the nearest discontinuity. The estimated counterfactual distribution is
calculated with a fth degree polinomial of distance to the discontinuity. The dashed green lines
denote the excluded region for the counterfactual discontinuity. Estimated bunching is calculated
as the percentage of the overall mass in excess of the estimated mass in the excluded region above
the discontinuity. The condence interval is calculated via bootstrapping.
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Figure 2·4: Bunching by election year
Estimated Bunching = 0.28 
 95% CI = [0.19,0.37]
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(a) 1987
Estimated Bunching = 0.09 
 95% CI = [−0.02,0.2]
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(b) 1991
Estimated Bunching = 0.17 
 95% CI = [0.07,0.27]
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(c) 1995
Estimated Bunching = 0.28 
 95% CI = [0.19,0.37]
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(d) 1999
Estimated Bunching = 0.21 
 95% CI = [0.1,0.29]
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(e) 2003
Estimated Bunching = 0.2 
 95% CI = [0.1,0.28]
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(f) 2007
Note: The unit of observation is the municipality. Each dot displays the number of municipalities
in a bin of 1% of distance to the nearest discontinuity. The estimated counterfactual distribution is
calculated with a fth degree polinomial of distance to the discontinuity. The dashed green lines
denote the excluded region for the counterfactual discontinuity. Estimated bunching is calculated
as the percentage of the overall mass in excess of the estimated mass in the excluded region above
the discontinuity. The condence interval is calculated via bootstrapping.
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Figure 2·5: Bunching by Census Status
Estimated Bunching = 0.12 
 95% CI = [0.04,0.2]
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(a) Bunching in Census Years
Estimated Bunching = 0.23 
 95% CI = [0.19,0.27]
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(b) Bunching in Non Census Years
Note: The unit of observation is the municipality. Each dot displays the number of municipalities
in a bin of 1% of distance to the nearest discontinuity. The estimated counterfactual distribution is
calculated with a fth degree polynomial of distance to the discontinuity. The dashed green lines
denote the excluded region for the counterfactual discontinuity. Estimated bunching is calculated
as the percentage of the overall mass in excess of the estimated mass in the excluded region above
the discontinuity. The condence interval is calculated via bootstrapping.
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Figure 2·6: Bunching by Decentralization Level
Estimated Bunching = 0.24 
 95% CI = [0.16,0.32]
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(a) Increase in Decentralization
Estimated Bunching = 0.19 
 95% CI = [0.15,0.24]
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(b) No Increase in Decentralization
Note: The unit of observation is the municipality. Each dot displays the number of municipalities
in a bin of 1% of distance to the nearest discontinuity. The estimated counterfactual distribution is
calculated with a fth degree polinomial of distance to the discontinuity. The dashed green lines
denote the excluded region for the counterfactual discontinuity. Estimated bunching is calculated
as the percentage of the overall mass in excess of the estimated mass in the excluded region above
the discontinuity. The condence interval is calculated via bootstrapping.
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Figure 2·7: Imputation Results
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Note: The graph is based on observations in the validation set. The validation set is composed
by one third of all observations that are not in the excluded region. The horizontal axis
represents population. The vertical one displays the imputed population. The 45 degree line that
would represent perfect prediction is also displayed.
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Figure 2·8: Imputed versus Reported Population
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Note: The unit of observation is the municipality. Each dot displays the number of municipal-
ities in a bin of 1% of distance to the nearest discontinuity. The dashed green lines denote the
excluded regions for the imputation method. Estimated bunching is calculated as the percent-
age of the overall reported mass in excess of the imputed mass in the excluded region above the
discontinuity.
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Table 2.1: Council size rule
Population Representatives
≤ 100 3
[101 , 250] 5
[251 , 1,000] 7
[1,001 , 2000] 9
[2,001 , 5,000] 11
[5,001 , 10,000] 13
[10,001 , 20,000] 17
[20,001 , 50,000] 21
[50,001 , 100,000] 25
Note: This table shows the council
size in municipal elections as a func-
tion of the population in the munici-
pality, in accordance to Law 5/1985.
Table 2.2: Evolution of Population in Spanish municipalities
1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Mean 4,778 4,951 4,992 4,964 5,176 5,526 5,810
Q1 230 225 209 198 190 184 178
Q2 628 628 607 587 577 576 587
Q3 2,203 2,236 2,190 2,190 2,212 2,360 2,493
99 perc 63,052 65,082 66,055 64,439 70,893 77,601 82,489
Note: The sample is composed by all Spanish municipalities that report
electoral results for each election year. Q1, Q2 and Q3 denote each of the
quartiles of the population distribution.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Number Parties 55,901 2.91 1.52 1 25
Pr Majority 55,901 0.81 0.39 0 1
Turnout 55,901 0.62 0.15 0.002 4.33
Seats by 1st Party 55,901 5.13 2.29 1 34
% Seats by 1st Party 55,901 0.66 0.19 0.18 1.00
% Dierence in Votes 49,675 0.26 0.21 0.00 1.00
One Party Council 55,901 0.11 0.31 0 1
Two Party Council 55,901 0.36 0.48 0 1
Population 55,901 5,220.51 45,275.74 4 3,273,049
Note: The sample is composed by all Spanish municipalities that report electoral
results for each election year for each election year in the period 1987-2011. Num-
ber of parties denotes the number of parties that obtained representation in the
council. The dierence in votes is dened as the share of votes casted for the most
voted party minus the share of votes casted for the second most voted party. The
variables one and two party council denote the proportion of municipalities in
which only one or two parties obtained seats in the council.
Table 2.4: Summary of Public Spending and Revenue Subcategories
% of Total Spending Mean SD % of Total Revenue Mean SD
Personnel 0.224 0.109 Direct Taxes 0.185 0.094
Services 0.277 0.101 Indirect Taxes 0.0312 0.038
Financial Expenses 0.044 0.046 Fees 0.148 0.087
Infrastructure 0.377 0.178 Revenue from Assets 0.061 0.094
Transfers to Public Entities 0.050 0.046 Government Transfers 0.261 0.125
Transfers to Private Entities 0.026 0.475 Debt 0.045 0.061
(N=21,461) Capital Transfers 0.237 0.175
Note: The sample is composed by all Spanish municipalities for which public spending data is
available in the period 1987-2009 and was matched to the electoral results data.
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Table 2.5: Likelihood of Bunching by Census Year
Dependent variable:
Just Above Threshold (dist < 0.05)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Census Year −0.011∗∗∗ −0.007∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Log Population 0.002∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.020∗
(0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.011)
Distance 0.145∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.014)
Municipality FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 33,131 33,131 33,131 33,131
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of one if
the municipality is right above the threshold, dened as above by less
than 5% of the discontinuity. The sample is composed by all election
years from 1987 to 2011. Census Year is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one if the election year was also a Census Year (this hap-
pens both in 1991 and 2001). Robus standard errors in parenthesese
clustered at the municipality level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Table 2.6: Bunching on Election Years
Dependent variable:
Above Threshold (1) (2) (3)
Election 0.020? 0.021?? 0.062???
Year (1.912) (2.063) (3.043)
Log 0.020??? 0.021???
population (8.699) (8.638)
Bandwidth < 1% < 1% < 1%
Year FE X
N 2900 2900 2900
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of one if the
municipality is right above the threshold, dened as above by less than
1% of the discontinuity. Election Year is a dummy variable that takes
a value of one in years where municipal elections were held. Robust
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the municipality level. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Table 2.7: Bunching on Election Years (b)
Dependent variable:
Above Threshold (1) (2) (3)
Election 0.005?? 0.005?? 0.014???
Year (2.048) (2.075) (2.983)
Log 0.004??? 0.004???
population (7.611) (7.602)
Bandwidth < 5% < 5% < 5%
Year FE X
N 12809 12809 12809
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of one if the
municipality is right above the threshold, dened as above by less than 5%
of the discontinuity. Election Year is a dummy variable that takes a value
of one in years where municipal elections were held. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at the municipality level. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Table 2.8: Revenue from transfers (per capita)
Above Threshold 85.5 30.9 -42.3 17.9 37.1
(0.53) (0.26) (-0.42) (0.21) (0.47)
Above Threshold 1999 -49.2 -76.8∗∗∗ -52.4∗∗ -42.9∗ -40.0∗
(-1.34) (-2.62) (-1.98) (-1.81) (-1.72)
R2 470.1 461.5 462.6 456.2 456.6
Y Mean 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14
N 718 1331 1958 2538 3134
Notes: Each column corresponds to a dierent bandwidth: 5, 10, 15, 20
and 25%. Controls include: quadratic of distance to the discontinuity, in-
teracted with a dummy for above the discontinuity, population and dis-
continuity xed eects. t-stats in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.10. Sample is for the year 2001.
Table 2.9: Comparison Imputation Methods
MSE Tset MSE Vset N Tset N Vset
OLS Population 370 335 10238 5119
OLS Polynomial Population 299 297 10238 5119
OLS Pop and NL 367 332 10238 5119
OLS Polynomial Pop and NL 294 294 10238 5119
RF Pop 452 594 10238 5119
RF Pop and NL 283 597 10238 5119
Ensemble Learning 1 266 289 10238 5119
Ensemble Learning 2 266 291 10238 5119
Ensemble Learning 3 230 405 10238 5119
Notes: Each row corresponds to a dierent imputation method. The impu-
tation methods are estimated in the training set and the mean square error
(MSE) is calculated in the validation set. Observations in the excluded region
are not included in neither the training nor the validation set.
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Table 2.10: Determinants of Misreporting
Dependent variable:
Pop - ˆPop Over-reporter
All Sample Just Above All Sample Just Above
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnout (t-1) 0.075∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗
(0.021) (0.011) (0.064) (0.044)
Majority (t-1) 0.001 0.011 −0.021 0.023
(0.003) (0.007) (0.014) (0.041)
% Seats 1st Party (t-1) −0.023 −0.026 0.029 0.011
(0.019) (0.056) (0.074) (0.242)
Di Votes 1st 2nd Party (t-1) 0.003 0.002 −0.049 −0.009
(0.014) (0.030) (0.044) (0.142)
Number Parties (t-1) −0.007∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.015
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.016)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Discontinuity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,641 1,608 15,641 1,608
R2 0.222 0.300 0.222 0.300
Notes: In the rst two columns the dependent variable is the dierence between reported
and predicted population. In the last two, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes a
value of one if the reported population is above the predicted one. Odd columns run this
regressions for all municipalities, even columns for municipalities above the nearest cuto
and with a distance of less than 5%. All regressions include controls for year and cuto xed
eects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.10.
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Chapter 3
The Long Term Impact of WWII
Casualties on U.S. Political
Preferences
3.1 Introduction
The quality of institutions plays a key role in economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson, 2001, 2002). However, what determines institutions, and how these are
shaped remains an open question. In democratic countries, the main avenue for citizens
to express their public preferences and aect institutions is through voting and electing
public ocials. In this paper, we study one of the main military conicts in history, World
War II, and focus on how this event may have shaped American institutions through the
changes in political preferences of the electorate in the United States.
World War II is the armed conict with the highest death toll in history, the estimates
ranging between 60-75 million people. As such, it has shaped culture, institutions and
policy world wide for the last 80 years. The United States suered more than 400,000
military deaths during this conict. In this paper, we study whether communities that
suered more fatalities changed their political preferences as a response to this “shock".
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There are several mechanisms studied in the literature that could explain such an ef-
fect. First, communities that suered heavier losses during the conict may have learned
about the true “costs of war". As such, they may have taken a more anti-war stance later
on, resulting in higher support for isolationist candidates. Second, it could also be possi-
ble that these communities developed resentment towards the president and the political
party that engaged the United States in this conict. Both these avenues have been ex-
plored in the literature by a theory called the “proximate casualties theory" (Gartner, 2008;
Kriner and Shen, 2014). This hypothesis states that popular support for American wars
is undermined more from deaths of American personnel from nearby areas more than by
overall fatalities. Previously, this was understood as a dierence in exposure to informa-
tion about war costs. This in turn leads to lower support for incumbent politicians, but
most studies suggest that these eects dissipate either in a matter of weeks (Hayes and
Myers, 2009) or in a matter of months (Gartner, Segura, and Barratt, 2004). Evidence of
this theory after the Iraq war is explored by Karol and Miguel (2007), who nd a neg-
ative relation between higher fatalities and Bush’s vote share even after controlling for
observable characteristics. Althaus, Bramlett, and Gimpel (2012) nd that local deaths
have a much larger negative inuence on public support for the Iraq War than cumula-
tive national deaths, that the negative eect is larger among people who are inattentive
to local news, and these local fatality eects decay substantially over time. Related to this
literature, Loewen and Rubenson (2010) study whether voters punish incumbents for the
costs of war in the context of Canada. In particular, they test whether in districts with
higher war deaths there was less support for incumbents, and they don’t nd evidence to
back that hypothesis. They do nd that support for the Conservative Party increases in
districts with higher war deaths.
In order to study the relationship between fatalities and these attitudes, we collect
individual level data about United States mobilization and fatality rates at the county
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level, and study how voting during presidential elections in counties that were heavily
aected by the war evolved after the conict ended. In this paper, we focus on the long
term impact of these fatalities, and study whether the “proximate casualties hypothesis”
shifted U.S. political preferences after counties suered heavy losses from this conict.
Some of our early ndings seem to suggest that when we use fatalities to construct
a proxy for the costs of military conicts, fatalities during World War II may have had
a deeper impact than what the proximate casualties theory would predict. Some of our
specications nd that counties that were deeply aected by World War II, as measured in
a higher rate of enlisted soldiers that died, show lower support for Republican presidential
candidates in elections between the 1950s to the present day. We test the robustness of
these results since this nding would contradict the “proximate casualties theory" in a
couple of ways: rst, Democrats were the party in power when the United States joined
the conict, and this would suggest a higher support for incumbents. Second, this eect
seems long lasting and permanent, suggesting that the beliefs about the true costs of
war could have been permanently updated. Upon further research, we nd these early
results to be unreliable: they are not robust to our measure of the costs of war nor to the
choice of regression specication. Therefore, we fail to nd enough evidence to conclude
that political preferences permanently shifted in the United States as a result of fatalities
suered during World War II.
This paper would contribute to the literature that explores the deeper impacts military
conicts have had on the United States’ economy and society. One key nding in this lit-
erature is the impact that mobilizing 16 million American to this conict had on increasing
female labor supply. Goldin (1991), Goldin and Olivetti (2013) Doepke, Hazan, and Maoz
(2015) Bellou and Cardia (2016) Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle (2004) Jaworski (2014) are some
examples of this work. The hypothesis that this conict also impacted the labor supply of
African American workers has also been studied: Ferrara (2017) shows that the deaths of
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semi-skilled white workers lead to black workers upgrading their skills. Similar studies
have analyzed the impact of more recent conicts on labor supply, such as the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars (Christensen, 2017). Some of these changes may have aected political
preferences, and help explain the underlying relationship between fatalities and changes
in voting behavior. In particular, some of the research relating World War II and labor
supply hints at a change in culture. For instance, it has been argued that wives of children
whose mothers worked as a result of the men mobilized during the conict are more likely
to work themselves (Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti, 2004). It is worth noting that fatalities
have also been documented to deeply aect marriage markets, as shown by (Abramitzky,
Delavande, and Vasconcelos, 2011) and out of wedlock births (Bethmann and Kvasnicka,
2012). These are other avenues through which fatalities could aect long term voting
behaviors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section Two describes the historical
background of this conict and the following presidential campaigns. Section Three de-
scribes the data sources. Section Four explores the empirical strategy and results of this
exercise, and Section Five concludes.
3.2 Historical Background
United States Involvement in World War II and the Draft
World War II was a war that involved nearly every country and major territory in the
world to some extent in one of two opposing alliances, the Allies and the Axis. The
war lasted nearly six years, from September 1st of 1939, when Germany invaded Poland,
to 1945, when Germany signed its unconditional surrender on May 8th, and Japan on
September 2nd, and the death toll of this conict is the highest in history.
The United States involvement in this war is summarized by the time-line below. Ini-
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tially reticent to be directly involved in the conict, the president at the time, the Democrat
Franklin D. Roosevelt declared its country’s neutrality in 1937 through the Quarantine
Speech. However, while still neutral, the United States provided aid to the Allies in the
form of money, weapons and materials.
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Formal entry of the United States into the war happened after the Japanese took unan-
nounced military action against the United States by attacking the naval base of Pearl
Harbor in Hawaii on December 7th, 1942. The following day, the United States declared
formal war on Japan, and on December 11th, Germany and Italy declared war on the
United States.
The United States deployed troops mostly in the Pacic area during 1942, in the war
eort against Japan. U.S. forces in Europe were deployed more signicantly during the
period 1943-1945 working together with British Forces, particularly in Italy. At this time,
the United States forces represented about a third of the Allied forces deployed.
By 1944, the tides of the conict had turned in favor of the Allies both in Europe and
the Pacic: the main invasion of France took place, and Japanese islands were captured
by U.S. troops that year. Finally, Berlin fell to the Soviet army in 1945, and Germany
surrendered.
Particularly relevant to this project is the process by which United States troops were
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enlisted during World War II. On September 16th, 1940, the United States enacted the rst
peace time draft through the Selective Training and Service Act. This law required all
male citizens between the ages of 21 and 35 to register for the draft. The Selective Service
System, an independent agency originally created during the rst World War was reestab-
lished and in charged with the responsibility of identifying possible enlistees. This act also
limited military service to 12 months unless Congress deemed an extension necessary.
Once registered, draftees were given a number between 1 and 7,836 by one of the 6,443
local draft boards. A national lottery was held in Washington, where each possible number
was place in a capsule, and all capsules were put in a bowl. The rst time this lottery took
place in 1940, it was Secretary of War Henry Stimson, while blindfolded, who selected
numbers out of the bowl. Those registered men that held one of the numbers selected
from the bowl were brought to the local draft boards to be considered for service.
Local draft boards then placed men into one of four categories. Class I were those
ready for military service. Class II were those who obtained a work deferment. These
were mostly farmers and workers in industries key to the war eorts. Class III were those
male citizens with dependents. Finally, those placed Class IV were citizens with some
type of physical, mental or moral incapacity. It is important to note that the Selective
Training and Service Act prohibited racial discrimination. However, the Army’s policy
was to segregate training facilities and military units, therefore many black men were
excluded from service, or even when they served, they were less likely to be in the front
line of battle.
The Selective Training and Service Act was amended in several key ways during the
course of the conict. The length of military service was extended by 18 months in 1941.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor: the age bandwidth was expanded to all male citizens
between the ages of 18 and 44, the process became more centralized, reducing the power
of local draft boards, and the length of service extended to the duration of the war plus six
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months. More importantly, in December 1942 voluntary enlistments for all men between
the ages of 18 and 37 were suspended. We observe this pattern clearly in our data in
Figure 3·1. In this Figure the number of enlistees are plotted for each year, divided by those
with dependents and those without. For the years 1940, 1941 and 1942 a big proportion of
enlistees had no dependents, however, for the reminder of the conict, the proportion of
enlistees with dependents is almost the same as those without, compelling evidence for
this change in policy. This was the policy that determined enlistment in the United States
Army for the duration of the conict as well as the Navy and Marine Corps starting in
1943.
Short History of Post War United States Presidential Elections
This paper tests the hypothesis that fatalities during World War II aected U.S. political
preferences. This hypothesis hinges on the fact that, on average, Republican candidates
represent dierent preferred policies over foreign policy, interventionism and defense
spending, areas we believe are more likely to be impacted by fatalities during World War
II. Therefore, we proceed to discuss whether the Republican party actually represented
substantially dierent policies in post war presidential elections.
Dwight Eisenhower was the presidential candidate in both 1952 and 1956. He won the
presidential election in landslides, defeating Adlai Stevenson in both occasions, obtaining
55.2% and 57.4% of the popular vote, respectively. This marked the rst time since 1932
that the United States had a Republican president. One of the main campaign issues in the
1952 election was the handling of the Korean war by president Truman, the Democratic
incumbent, as well as the lack of foreign intervention in Latin America, failing to stop the
expansion of Communism. In 1956, Stevenson ran a campaign in which he called for an
increase in government spending on social programs and a decrease in military spending.
This seems to support that the idea of Republicans taking a more interventionist approach
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than Democrats during this decade, and it being a salient point during both campaigns.
The Democrats took control of the oval oce back in 1960 and 1964. In 1960, Richard
Nixon, who served as Vice President of the United States on both of Eisenhower’s terms,
lost to John F. Kennedy. During this election, once again, the Cold War was the main is-
sue to dominate the campaign. Kennedy challenged Eisenhower on the administration’s
defense spending policies, as well as promoting a push for the “Space Race" and an in-
creased spending in research and technology to catch up with the Soviet Union, who
had successfully launched the rst man-made satellite to orbit Earth in 1957. In 1964,
the election focused around civil rights issues and Barry Goldwater lost to incumbent
Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had succeeded Kennedy after his assassi-
nation. Goldwater was labeled by Democrats as an extremist and prone to the use of the
nuclear weapons, as evidenced by a famous television ad, that aired only once but had
tremendous popular impact, the “Daisy Ad". In this ad, a little girl plucked daisy petals in
a meadow. When she reached nine, her voice was supplanted by a nuclear countdown.
When the countdown reached zero, the mushroom shape associated with a nuclear blast
was shown. Afterwards, a second voice over asked viewers to vote for Johnson.
The Republicans won again in 1968 and 1972, when Richard Nixon defeated the Democrats
Hubert Humphrey and George McGovern. While Nixon vowed to put an end the Vietnam
war during the 1968 campaign, he proceeded to bomb Cambodia and order incursions in
Laos. The peace accords were signed in 1973. Nixon is said to have appealed to the “silent
majority" or Americans, those who had a disliked for the 1960s counter culture movement
and the anti war protesters. At the same time, he instituted the “Nixon Doctrine", which
meant American soldiers would not be sent to conicts involving American allies unless
a nuclear threat was involved. He also became the rst American president to visit the
Republic of China and he enacted a policy of détente with the Soviet Union, lowering the
threat of an actual war.
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After Nixon’s resignation in 1973, Gerald Ford was sworn president on the United
States. He ran for reelection in 1976, and lost to Democrat Jimmy Carter. During Gerald
Ford’s time in oce, he continued the détente policy put forth by his predecessor. Perhaps
most indicative of their attitudes towards war and war protesters, was the fact that Jimmy
Carter promised a pardon for religious refugees and Vietnam War dodgers. In the eighties,
the Republicans took back the Oval Oce, as Ronald Reagan defeated incumbent Jimmy
Carter and Walter Mondale in 1980 and 1984, with future president George Bush as his
running mate. One of the main campaign promises that Reagan ran under was the promise
of restoring America’s military strength. He ran under a similar platform in 1984, whereas
his opponent, Walter Mondale, proposed a nuclear freeze.
In 1988 and 1992, George H.W. Bush was the Republican presidential candidate. In
1988, he defeated Michael Dukakis, who was labeled by Republicans as an extreme liberal.
Bush campaign focused on maintaining Reagan’s policies, without radical changes. With
Bush as president, the United States engaged, together with its allies, in the Gulf War
between August of 1990 and February of 1991, as a response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
At the end of the conict, Bush received the highest job approval rating any president had
had since the 1930s. In 1992, he lost the reelection to Democrat Bill Clinton. Clinton was
attacked for his lack of foreign policy experience, but the economy was in recession, and
after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, foreign policy was
regarded of secondary importance during the campaign. In 1996, Bill Clinton secured
reelection by defeating Republican candidate Senator Bob Dole obtaining 379 electoral
votes, compared to the 159 obtained by Dole. Dole ran under a platform of lowering taxes
and supply side economics, but the booming economy made his chances of victory slim.
George W. Bush was elected president in 2000, after defeating Al Gore, and reelected
in 2004, when he faced John Kerry. While the rst campaign was focused mostly on
domestic issues, after the attacks of September 11, foreign policy was the main driver
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of the 2004 campaign. Kerry criticized Bush’s strategy leading and during the Iraq War.
Bush sought to present himself as the candidate that would be tough on terrorism, whereas
Kerry’s supporters were more critical of the United States’ intervention in Iraq. In 2008
and 2012, Democrat Barack Obama defeated Republicans John McCain and Mitt Romney.
Particularly relevant to this paper is the fact that, in 2008, campaigning focused heavily
on the Iraq War. McCain supported the war, while Obama strongly opposed it. The 2008
was more heavily focused on domestic issues. Finally, in 2016, Republican Donald Trump
won the general election over Democrat Hillary Clinton.
In conclusion, barring some exception, such as the 1960 campaign, it seems that Re-
publican candidates have had a higher level of support for interventionist policies, as well
as being more in favor of increasing defense spending and engaging in military actions.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In order to assess the eect of World War II on United States political preferences, we
combine three dierent data sets. The rst one are fatalities and missing in action records
from the National Archives for both the Army and the Navy at the county level. These
documents that we digitize contain the name and rank of each person in the United States
military that lost their life during this conict or were missing in action, the county of
origin and whether they served for the Army or the Navy. These documents contain the
county for each state, and the name of the soldier. Next to the name there are two set of
acronyms. The rst documents the rank of the soldier (Sargent, Private). The second state
what was his fate (killed in action, died of wounds, died non in battle, etc). Given these
documents we manually create a data set at the county level with the number of fatalities
in each United States county for both the Navy and the Army. Further data could be
extracted from these documents, such as fatalities by rank, or type of fatalities, but given
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that these are scanned documents that are not digitized, that was not feasible at this time.
We combine fatalities data with World War II Army Enlistment Records documenting
the period 1938 to 1946 from the National Archives. These data set contains individual
level enlistment data, with county of origin, educational attainment and whether or not
the enlisted individual had dependents. This data allows us to create a variable that mea-
sures the number of enlistees from each county. Using County Census Data from 1940
from ICPSR, we create fatality to enlistment, fatality to population, and enlistment to
population variables. When we refer to population we use the closest census year data
available, 1940. These will be the main variable we use to measure the shock that counties
suered following World War II. One shortcoming of our study is the non availability of
Navy enlistment data. Therefore, for robustness, we will perform the same analysis using
only Army fatalities.
Descriptive statistics for this data are shown in Table 3.1. The average county in the
U.S. suered 113 fatalities, mostly from the Army, 94 on average, with respect to 19 from
the Navy. The population of the average U.S. county in 1940 was 40,608, and around 2,300
men were enlisted per county. This Table also shows the number of men age 15-44 in
1940. This variable represents the population most likely to be drafted during the conict.
Out of these men, 24% of them are drafted into the Army. The fatality to enlistment ratio
is on average 6%, meaning that the average county loses 6% of their enlisted men during
the conict. If we focus exclusively on Army fatalities, the average drops to 5%. We also
show the percentage of all 1940 men that lose their life due to the war.
One possible concern with the fatality rate is that maybe all counties suered similarly
from World War II conditional on enlistment rates. This would mean that we would not
have enough variation to pick up on any changes in culture due to fatalities. We address
this concern in Figure 3·2. This histogram shows the distribution of the fatality rate in
U.S. counties. Most counties lost 5-6% of all enlisted men, but some lost over 10-12%.
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We further study the geographic distribution of fatality rates and enlistment rates in a
couple of maps. In these heat maps, brighter colors denote higher values. In Figure 3·3,
percentiles of the fatality rate are displayed. Geographical patterns are clear, with the
Midwest of the United States having higher fatality rates on average, whereas counties in
Florida, Georgia and South Carolina seem to have lower fatality rates on average. This
will prompt the use of state xed eects in all of specications, so that we can exploit
variation across counties within a state.
In the second gure, we show the proportion of men that were enlisted to ght during
the conict (Figure 3·4). What we can observe in this graph is that although counties in
the Midwest suered higher fatalities rates, they had fewer men serving during World
War II. This is consistent with the fact that there is a higher share of farmers on these
parts of the United States, and farmers were given deferrals in order to keep the domestic
food supply. Figure 3·5 shows the percentiles of the proportion of 1940 men that died in
World War II. Here, a dierent trend appears compared to the fatality rate: counties in
the West suered heavier losses, whereas counties near the South still seem to have lower
than average fatalities. These lower casualties in the South seem to concentrate around
the area known as “the cotton belt", counties in the Southern region of the United States
known for their cotton production between the 18th and 20th century. Therefore, these
are counties with a higher proportion African American, consistent with the hypothesis
that African American were less likely to serve and die during the conict.
Finally, to attest the impact that fatalities had on culture, we use county level voting
records in presidential elections. This data comes from Leip’s Atlas of Presidential Elec-
tions, and we focus on elections from 1900 to 2016. This data includes turnout records, as
well as the vote share for the Republican and the Democratic candidate in each county.
Figure 3·6. This Figure shows the evolution of turnout, Democratic and Republican vote
shares over time, for all elections between 1944 and 2016.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
The empirical strategy we use in this paper is an event study analysis. We want to test
whether political preferences changed as a response to fatalities suered during World
War II. Therefore, our baseline specication is the following:
Yct =
∑
t,1940
βt1{Year = t}xMeasure of Fatalitiesc + σst + σc + εct (3.1)
The unit of observation is county c in election year t . As our measure of political
preferences we use the percentage of all votes in a county for the Republican candidate
in each presidential election (in logs). The main reason for using presidential vote share
is that commanders in chief have a lot of inuence over foreign policy, so if we expect
attitudes towards war to change after being aected by the fatalities suered during World
War II, presidential elections are a better measure than state, local or midterm elections.
Furthermore, the American presidential election system has been dominated by only two
parties since the very beginning, making possible the comparison of voting preferences
over time.
Given the geographic trends that fatalities and enlistment showed previously, a full set
of county (γc ) xed eects as well as state times election xed eects (
∑
t,1940 γt1(Year =
t )xσs ) are included in the main specications. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level, allowing error dependence within counties over time.
The main explanatory variable is some measure of the shock caused by the fatalities in
these counties. Through fatalities, we are trying to measure how costly citizens in these
counties understand war to be. There are plausible stories for two dierent measures.
The rst is what we call the fatality over enlistment ratio, the proportion men died in
county c among those that were enlisted (in log scale). The intuition behind this measure
is that perhaps citizens estimate the cost of war by the survival rate of soldiers in their
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communities. Let’s consider two towns that each send 100 men to serve during World War
II. If town A loses half of these man, but town B loses only one tenth, it seems plausible
that citizens in town A will update their beliefs about the costs of war dierently than
those in town B. This variable has a number of advantages over the proportion of the total
population that died during the war. This alternative suers from some known biases by
not controlling for enlistment rates. Enlistment is not random: counties with a higher
share of farmers are likely to mobilize less troops to the conict. Counties with a higher
share of black population are also less likely to be mobilized, since at the time, black men
were less likely to serve. One concern to our specication is that, even when black men
did serve, they were less likely to be put on the front lines due to unsegregated regiments,
and they were more likely to serve as cooks, janitors, etc. These trends were shown to be
present in the maps of fatalities.
By creating as our main explanatory variable the proportion of enlistees that died
during the war, the main identication assumption is that a county having a high or a
low fatality rate, given the number of troops sent to the conict is as good as random.
Although this is a non testable assumption, we can present some compelling evidence for
our identication strategy in the form of pre-trends. We run the regression for election
years between 1900 and 1940 as well as post 1940. If somehow our measure of fatalities
during the war aects voting prior to the conict, then that would be evidence that some
non random characteristic in our variable is correlated with voting patterns. The results
show that there are no pretends impact of fatalities on voting for the Republican candidate
on presidential elections. Finally, all our regressions include a full set of state times year
xed, as well as counties xed eects, and are weighted by 1940 population.
Therefore, Figure 3·7 shows the estimates from the following specication:
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Yct =
∑
t,1940
βt1{Year = t}x FatalitiescEnlisteesc + σst + σc + εct (3.2)
The rst panel in Figure 3·7 displays the estimates of our specication. Each dot in
the Figure is the estimated eect of the fatality over enlistment ratio interacted with an
election year dummy. The omitted category is the election year 1940. Prior to World
War II, none of the coecients are signicantly dierent from zero. This is reassuring of
our identication strategy. Post World War II, the estimates are negative, and they start
to become signicantly dierent from zero after 1950. Note, this is the rst time that
American Army General Dwight Eisenhower ran for president, and the rst time post
World War II that foreign policy was the main issue during the campaign. The estimates
remain negative for the rest of the sample period, indicating that this eect is long lasting
and does not dissipate over time. For the period 1950-2016, the impact of this eect is fairly
large: the estimate is, on average, -0.5. Since all regressions are run in logarithmic scale,
this implies that an increase of one percent in fatality rate is associated with a decrease
of half a percentage point in the support of the Republican presidential candidate.
A rst concern with this specication is the fact that we do not that we do not observe
Navy enlistment rates. Therefore, we run the same specication using exclusively Army
fatalities to compute the fatality rate. The results of this regression are shown in the
second panel of Figure 3·7. The results show very similar estimates, with the exception
that the estimated impact becomes non signicant in the last three elections. Once again,
there is no signicant impact prior to 1944.
We run two dierent robustness tests on Figure 3·8. The rst panel addresses the
concern that fatalities may just be a function of the number of enlisted soldiers, and we
are just picking up the eects of enlistment with out measures of fatalities. We address
this by regressing the presidential vote share on the enlistment rate of each county (in
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logs):
Yct =
∑
t,1940
βt1{Year = t}x EnlisteescPopulationc
+ σst + σc + εct (3.3)
The estimates are collected on the rst panel Figure 3·8. This gure shows that the
enlistment rate does not seem to have any impact on presidential vote shares over the
period following World War II.
A second important consideration is the racial composition on counties prior to the
War. As our maps showed, it seems that fatality over enlistment is higher in counties with
a higher share of white men, and lower in those with a higher fraction of African American
population. Therefore, the driver behind the estimates on Figure 3·7 could be the racial
composition of counties. We address this hypothesis by controlling for the percentage of
African American population interacted with election year:
Yct =
∑
t,1940
βt1{Year = t}x FatalitiescEnlisteesc +∑
t,1940
αt1{Year = t}x Black PopcPopulationc
+ σst + σc + εct
(3.4)
As we can observe, even controlling for race, there is still a signicantly negative
impact of the fatality over enlistment ratio can on the Republican vote share. This seems
compelling evidence of race not being the main driver of this negative eect.
However, a second plausible measure of the shock these counties suered is the pro-
portion of people in the county that died during the conict. This is a better measure
if we believe that the channel through which political preferences are aected is a more
personal one: perhaps political preferences change when a citizen in these communities
personally knows a soldier who lost their live in World War II, and make these citizens
views of war, foreign policy and politics change. If that is the case, counties where a higher
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share of population lost their life have a higher proportion of people who knew a fallen
soldier. We try to capture this by regressing the Republican vote share on the fatalities
over population ratio, interacted with election year dummies:
Yct =
∑
t,1940
βt1{Year = t}x FatalitiescPopulationc
+
∑
t,1940
αt1{Year = t}x EnlisteescPopulationc
+ σst + σc + εct
(3.5)
The spirit of this specication is similar to the rst regression: we want to isolate the
eect of fatalities, while comparing counties with similar enlistment rates. However, the
results, shown by Figure 3·9 are quite dierent. There seems to be no signicant impact
of fatalities on voting preferences once the enlistment rate is accounted for. Therefore,
it would appear that the results shown by Figure 3·7 are not particularly robust. The
dierence between the two panels of Figure 3·9 is whether controls for enlistment are
included in the regression. However, the point estimates on the share of fatalities are
extremely similar and do not seem to be aected by the inclusion of these controls.
Since the results appear to be not very robust, we show the results of several dier-
ent specications in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In this tables, we collect the estimates from six
plausible dierent specications, running the following regression. This regression is a
simpler version of the estimates shown in previous graphs, where the impact of the fa-
talities are imposed to be constant across 5 election periods (or 20 year periods), while
still exibly controlling for state times election year xed eects. The dierence across
columns in Table 3.2 is the measure of fatalities. In the rst column we use the number of
fatalities divided by the number of enlistees. In the second column, we use fatalities over
enlistment but control for the average education of enlistees, as well as the proportion of
African Americans living in the county in 1940. These controls are interacted with period
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dummies. In the third column, the main explanatory variable is the Army fatalities over
enlistment ratio. Columns four and ve use the fatalities over population ratio as the mea-
sure of loss of life during World War II. The dierence between these two columns is that
the sixth one controls for enlistment interacted with 20 year period dummies, whereas
the fth one does not. Finally, the last column uses the enlistment rate as our main ex-
planatory variable. Table 3.2 shows the results where both the Republican Vote Share and
the measure of fatalities are calculated in logarithmic scale, whereas Table 3.3 does not
use logarithmic scale.
Yct = βpre1{Year < 1944}xFatalitiesc+
β1944−19601{Year ∈ [1944, 1960]}xFatalitiesc+
β1964−19801{Year ∈ [1964, 1980]}xFatalitiesc+
β1984−20001{Year ∈ [1984, 2000]}xFatalitiesc+
β2004−20161{Year ∈ [2004, 2016]}xFatalitiesc+
+σst + σc + εct
(3.6)
Analysis of both Table 3.2 and 3.3 allows us to draw several conclusions. First, the
use of logarithmic scale on both side of the regression equation does not seem to play a
signicant role in the results, the estimates are fairly similar across both tables. Second, as
we have shown previously, the choice of controls, whereas it is the proportion of African
American population, the education of enlistees or enlistment rates, does also not play
a key role. However, the negative impact of fatalities on Republican vote share depends
heavily on two factors: rst, the choice of explanatory variable, and second, whether
or not the regression is weighted by 1940 population. The signicantly negative eect
is present when the explanatory variable is the fatality over enlistment ratio, and when
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bigger counties are given a bigger weight in the regression analysis. In fact, when our
measure of fatalities is the ratio of fatalities over population, our regressions fail the pre-
trend analysis, and the eect on Republican vote is reversed and positive.
This leads us to conclude that there is not enough evidence in our analysis to determine
that fatalities during World War II signicantly impacted long term political preferences.
Perhaps that was the case for bigger counties, but further research about the mechanism
and measure of these shocks is required.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the impact of World War II enlistment and fatalities on U.S. political
preferences. Economists and political scientists have developed the “proximate casualties
theory" which states that fatalities during military conicts impact short term political
preferences of voters, who tend to punish incumbents. The goal of this paper was to test
whether counties that suered heavier losses during World War II developed dierent
political preferences, not only in the short run, but in the long run.
To do that, we created a new data set containing the fatalities that each county in the
United States suered during World War II. We combined this data with Army individual
level enlistment data to test the impact of fatalities conditional on enlistment.
We use county level variation to analyze whether political preferences changed as
a result of fatalities during the conict in these communities. Although, we initially nd
some support for the hypothesis that fatalities may have decreased support for Republican
presidential candidates throughout the 20th century, this result is heavily dependent upon
the choice of measure of fatalities and the weighting of the regression analysis. Therefore,
we fail to nd sucient evidence that political preferences shifted as a result of fatalities
suered during World War II, or the avenue through which these changes may have taken
102
place.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 3·1: Number of Enlisted Solider to the Army by Year and Dependent
Status
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Note: This gure contains the number of enlistees to the United Army per year, between 1940 and
1945. For each year, they are divided into whether or not they have any dependents.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 1940
Mean SD Min Max
Number of Fatalities (Army) 94 328 0 9, 736
Number of Fatalities (Navy) 19 77 0 2, 541
Total Number of Fatalities 113 399 1 11, 451
Population in 1940 40, 608 137, 920 564 4, 063, 342
Men 15-44 in 1940 9, 714 34, 401 139 1, 011, 040
Enlistment (Army) 2, 376 8, 441 15 212, 512
Fatality to Enlistment Ratio 0.06 0.03 0.001 0.43
Army Fatality to Enlistment Ratio 0.05 0.02 0 0.37
Enlistment to 1940 Men 15-44 Ratio 0.24 0.33 0.02 13.85
Fatalities to 1940 Number of Men Ratio 0.01 0.004 0.0003 0.06
Fatalities to 1940 Population Ratio 0.003 0.001 0.0001 0.02
Note: The sample is composed by all counties in the U.S. where data on fatality rates is
available (2,875 out of 3,0007). The Fatality Rate is calculated as the total number of fa-
talities divided the number of enlisted soldiers. The enlistment rate is calculated as the
number of enlisted men divided the number of men age 15-44 in 1940.
Figure 3·2: Histogram Fatality to Enlistment Ratio
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Figure 3·3: Map of the Fatality to Enlistment Ratio
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15%
Fatality Rate
Note: The sample is composed by all counties in the U.S. where data on fatality rates is available
(2,875 out of 3,0007). The variable displayed is the percentile of the total number of fatalities
during World War II divided by the number of men enlisted to the army. Brightest colors represent
counties that suered a higher fatality rate.
Figure 3·4: Map of Enlistment to 1940 Men 15-44 Ratio
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Enlistment Rate
Note: Sample is composed by all counties with available data. The variable is the percentile of the
total number of fatalities during World War II divided by the number of men living in that county
according to the 1940 Census. War II divided by the number of men enlisted to the army.
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Figure 3·5: Map of Fatalities to 1940 Men Ratio
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Note: Sample is composed by all counties with available data. The variable is the percentile of the
total number of fatalities during World War II divided by the number of men living in that county
according to the 1940 Census. War II divided by the number of men enlisted to the army.
Figure 3·6: Evolution of Voting Variables over Time
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Note: This gure contains the population weighted average vote share for Republican and Demo-
crat candidates, as well as the population weighted average turnout in presidential elections from
1944 to 2016. Turnout data is unavailable for election years 2000-2016.
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Figure 3·7: Estimates of the Impact of the Fatality Rate on Republican Vote
Share
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(a) Fatality Rate
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(b) Army Fatality Rate
Note: The sample is composed by all counties for which fatality data is available, and all elec-
tion years between 1900 and 2016. The main explanatory variable is the number of total fatalities
divided by the number of Army enlistees in the rst panel and the number of total Army fatali-
ties divided by the number of army enlistees in the second. Both the explanatory variables and
the Republican vote share are calculated in logs. Estimates are obtained via Weighted OLS, the
weights being 1940 population. State times year xed eects and county xed eects are included.
The dotted line represents the 95% Condence Interval for the point estimates based on clustered
standard errors at the county level. 108
Figure 3·8: Robustness checks on the Estimates of the Fatality Rate on
Republican Vote Share
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(a) Impact of the Enlistment Rate on Republican Vote Share
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(b) Impact of the Fatality Rate controlling for % Blacks
Note: The sample is composed by all counties for which fatality data is available, and all elec-
tion years between 1900 and 2016. The main explanatory variable is the number of total fatalities
divided by the number of Army enlistees in the rst panel and the number of total Army fatali-
ties divided by the number of army enlistees in the second. Both the explanatory variables and
the Republican vote share are calculated in logs. Estimates are obtained via Weighted OLS, the
weights being 1940 population. State times year xed eects and county xed eects are included.
The dotted line represents the 95% Condence Interval for the point estimates based on clustered
standard errors at the county level. 109
Figure 3·9: Estimates of the Impact of the Fatalities over Population on
Republican Vote Share
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−20
0
20
1900 1916 1932 1952 1968 1984 2000 2016
Year
G
O
P 
Pr
es
id
en
tia
l V
o
te
 S
ha
re
 (lo
g)
(a) Without Controlling for Enlistment
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(b) Controlling for Enlistment
Note: The sample is composed by all counties for which fatality data is available, and all elec-
tion years between 1900 and 2016. The main explanatory variable is the number of total fatalities
divided by the number of Army enlistees in the rst panel and the number of total Army fatali-
ties divided by the number of army enlistees in the second. Both the explanatory variables and
the Republican vote share are calculated in logs. Estimates are obtained via Weighted OLS, the
weights being 1940 population. State times year xed eects and county xed eects are included.
The dotted line represents the 95% Condence Interval for the point estimates based on clustered
standard errors at the county level. 110
Table 3.2: Robustness of the Estimates of Fatalities on Log of Republican Vote Share
Independent Variable (in logs):
Panel A: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Weighted FatalitiesEnlistment
Fatalities
Enlistment
ArmyFatalities
Enlistment
Fatalities
Population
Fatalities
Population
Enlistment
Men15−44
Pre War -0.09 -0.05 -0.14 7.46*** 7.51** -0.00
(0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (3.12) (3.22) (0.02)
1944-1960 -0.10* -0.10* -0.18*** 2.59 3.03 -0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (2.25) (2.01) (0.08)
1964-1980 -0.34*** -0.32** -0.39*** -0.94 -0.39 -0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (3.46) (3.39) (0.08)
1984-2000 -0.45*** -0.43*** -0.50*** 3.25 3.65 0.04
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (3.93) (3.90) (0.10)
2000-2016 -0.51*** -0.46*** -0.37 10.78* 11.17* 0.14
(0.19) (0.17) (0.26) (6.52) (6.45) (0.13)
Panel B:
OLS Not Weighted FatalitiesEnlistment
Fatalities
Enlistment
ArmyFatalities
Enlistment
Fatalities
Population
Fatalities
Population
Enlistment
Men15−44
Pre War -0.09 -0.07 -0.10 5.42*** 5.79*** -0.01**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (1.56) (1.55) (0.01)
1944-1960 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 2.70** 3.48*** -0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (1.19) (1.33) (0.03)
1964-1980 -0.15** -0.05 -0.18*** 2.15 3.12* -0.05
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (1.58) (1.65) (0.03)
1984-2000 -0.08 -0.04 -0.13 4.24** 5.05*** -0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (1.58) (1.89) (0.03)
2000-2016 0.16 0.15 0.20* 8.67*** 9.42*** -0.02
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (2.39) (2.48) (0.02)
σst ,σc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Black, Education No Enlistment
N 88671 88671 88671 88671 88671 88671
Note: The sample is composed by all counties for which fatality data is available, and all election
years between 1900 and 2016. The dependent variable is the log of Republican presidential vote
share. The omitted category is the year 1940. Each column denotes a dierent explanatory
variable. Estimates are obtained via OLS Weighted by 1940 Population in Panel A, and regular
OLS in Panel B. State times year xed eects and county xed eects are included. Clustered
standard errors at the county level are shown. Signicance at the 10% level is represented by *,
at the 5% level by ** and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 3.3: Robustness of the Estimates of Fatalities on Republican Vote Share
Independent Variable:
Panel A: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Weighted FatalitiesEnlistment
Fatalities
Enlistment
ArmyFatalities
Enlistment
Fatalities
Population
Fatalities
Population
Enlistment
Men15−44
Pre War -0.11 -0.04 -0.20 12.80*** 12.68*** 0.02
(0.23) (0.23) (0.27) (4.73) (4.65) (0.02)
1944-1960 -0.13* -0.14* -0.22*** 6.49** 5.95* 0.02*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (3.06) (3.10) (0.01)
1964-1980 -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.47*** 3.47 2.74 0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (4.82) (4.85) (0.01)
1984-2000 -0.52*** -0.51*** -0.59*** 8.76* 7.50 0.04**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (5.25) (5.30) (0.02)
2000-2016 -0.56** -0.51*** -0.39 18.82** 16.89** 0.07*
(0.23) (0.19) (0.32) (8.65) (8.58) (0.03)
Panel B:
OLS Not Weighted FatalitiesEnlistment
Fatalities
Enlistment
ArmyFatalities
Enlistment
Fatalities
Population
Fatalities
Population
Enlistment
Men15−44
Pre War -0.11 -0.10 -0.13 9.26*** 9.26*** 0.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (2.26) (2.26) (0.00)
1944-1960 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 5.67*** 5.50*** 0.01
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (1.82) (1.83) (0.01)
1964-1980 -0.13 -0.06 -0.17* 5.98*** 5.90*** 0.00
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (2.22) (2.23) (0.00)
1984-2000 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 9.61*** 9.47*** 0.01***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (2.56) (2.56) (0.00)
2000-2016 0.33** 0.24* 0.41*** 17.17*** 17.02*** 0.01
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (3.57) (3.57) (0.01)
σst ,σc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Black, Education No Enlistment
N 88671 88671 88671 88671 88671 88671
Note: The sample is composed by all counties for which fatality data is available, and all election
years between 1900 and 2016. The dependent variable is the Republican presidential vote share.
The omitted category is the year 1940. Each column denotes a dierent explanatory variable.
Estimates are obtained via OLS Weighted by 1940 Population in Panel A, and regular OLS in
Panel B. State times year xed eects and county xed eects are included. Clustered standard
errors at the county level are shown. Signicance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by ** and at the 1% level by ***.
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